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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Appellants assert the following two issues on appeal:
1.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment

dismissing Appellants W. Scott Barrett's and Robert S lusher's claims for legal
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duties on the grounds of lack of causation where
significant factual issues exist as to whether Appellees Christensen & Jensen's and
L.Rich Humphries's malpractice and breaches of fiduciary duties in representing multiple
clients with conflicting interests and failing to investigate and adequately communicate a
settlement offer caused damage to Appellants.
Standard of Review: "When determining the propriety of a trial court's
grant of summary judgment, [the appellate court] review[s] the trial court's legal
conclusions for correctness, affording those legal conclusions no deference." Newman v.
Sonnenberg, 2003 UT App 401,^f 5, 81 P.3d 808 (quotations and citations omitted).
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved at R. 348-486; 487547;720-41A;1477-1538; 1960-67; 2063-78.
2.

Issue: Whether the trial court clearly erred by (a) failing to indicate how it

arrived at the $25,000 award or showing that this amount flows logically from the
evidence; and (b) erred as a matter of law by using an incorrect equitable measure that
does not reflect the parties' intended equitable attorney-fee division.

1

Standard of Review: "Whether a claimant has been unjustly enriched is a
mixed question of law and fact." Desert Mirah, Inc. v. B &L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83,Tf9,
12 P.3d 580. In equitable proceedings such as unjust enrichment, this Court reviews the
trial court's legal conclusions for "correctness" and upholds its findings of fact unless
"the evidence supporting them is so lacking that [it] must conclude the finding is 'clearly
erroneous." Id.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved at R. 1760-1810; 19682035; 2049-59; 2083-89; 2097-2104.
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Issue 1:
There are no statutory or constitutional provisions or other rules or regulations that
are determinative on this issue.1
Issue 2:
There are no statutory or constitutional provisions or other rules or regulations that
are determinative on this issue.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case arises as a result of C&J and LRU's malpractice in the aftermath of the
high profile State Farm punitive damage litigation considered by this Court several times
1

Appellants cite several provisions of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct to
show the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Appellees on
Appellants' legal malpractice claims. However, because a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, in itself, does not establish malpractice, but serves only as
evidence of an attorney's standard of conduct and care, these rules are not determinative.
2

and comprehensively reported in the landmark decision, Campbell v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, 65 P.3d 1134, reversed by State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003). The current and final chapter, and the
subject of this appeal, involves (1) an action for legal malpractice and (2) a dispute over
the division of attorney fees between counsel from the State Farm case.
Appellants are Barrett & Daines, W. Scott Barrett ("Barrett"), a lawyer of Barrett
& Daines (collectively, "Barrett") and Robert Slusher ("Slusher"). Slusher was a
common client of Barrett and Appellees, Christensen & Jensen, P.C. ("C&J") and one of
it's senior lawyers, L. Rich Humpherys ("LRH") in the State Farm case (C&J and LRH
are collectively referred to as "C&J," unless otherwise indicated).
Through the malpractice action, Slusher and Barrett seek redress for the egregious
breaches of the professional standard of care, the fiduciary duty of loyalty, and the ethical
violations committed by C&J in the underlying State Farm litigation, including
representing multiple clients with clearly divergent and conflicting interests; rejecting a
$150,000,000 settlement offer from State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance ("State Farm")
after only two-hours of consideration and no investigation or counteroffer; and, most
disturbingly, depriving Slusher of any opportunity or control over the decision to settle
his interest in the State Farm litigation. In the separate attorney-fee portion of the appeal,
Barrett challenges the measure used by the trial court to determine the equitable award

The extensive history of this case at the trial court, Utah Supreme Court, and U.S.
Supreme Court will not be recounted here. Rather, because this Court is already familiar
with the general background, this brief will focus solely on those facts and procedural
background relating to this appeal.
3

and whether its award of $25,000 flows logically from the evidence.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Barrett was co-counsel in the State Farm case with C&J under a joint
representation agreement. Together, C&J and Barrett represented Slusher, Curtis
Campbell, and John and Winnifred Ospital (sometimes "Clients" or "litigation group").
C&J initiated the instant suit on July 22, 2003 by filing a declaratory judgment action
against Barrett in an attempt to avoid paying Barrett his contractual portion of attorney
fees from the joint legal representation. (R. 1-2.)
Barrett counterclaimed for (1) declaratory judgment to enforce the joint
representation agreement originally entered into by C&J, Barrett and the Clients in
December 1984 and amended as between C&J and Barrett in October 1990, (2) breach of
the joint representation agreement's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
(3) for breach of fiduciary duty. (R 313-21.)
In addition, Barrett and Slusher counterclaimed against C&J and LRH for breach
of fiduciary relationship, and Slusher separately counterclaimed for (1) breach of
fiduciary relationship, (2) legal malpractice, (3) breach of contract, (4) constructive fraud,
and (5) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. 313-331.)
Although part of the same pleadings, the attorney-fee dispute and the malpractice
dispute involve distinct facts and followed separate paths in this litigation. The
malpractice-related counterclaims were resolved at summary judgment, while the distinct
attorney-fee claims went to a jury trial and then an equitable proceeding before the trial
court. As such, these disputes will be separately treated in this brief.
4

1.

Malpractice Counterclaims

C&J moved for summary judgment on the malpractice counterclaims on August 1,
2005, asserting only two grounds: (1) lack of causation; and (2) recovery of punitive
damages in an action for legal malpractice are barred as against public policy.3 (R. 35866; 724.) Thus, for the purposes of summary judgment, C&J conceded that fact issues
existed as to the other elements of legal malpractice—an attorney-client relationship;
breach of fiduciary duty, contract, or negligence; and damages.4
Slusher and Barrett opposed summary judgment based on the significant material
issues of fact that existed regarding causation, including (a) whether C&J's violation of
its professional, fiduciary and contractual duties in representing clients with conflicting
interests and failing to provide sufficient information and advice to these clients caused
C&J to reject State Farm's November 14, 2001 settlement offer without the Clients'
informed consent, thereby damaging Slusher and Barrett; (b) whether C&J's breaches of
the duty of loyalty to Slusher and of the Rules of Professional Conduct, in requiring all
settlement decisions be unanimous, caused Slusher to lose an opportunity to settle his
interest in the judgment against State Farm prior to certiorari being granted by the United

3

Although the parties briefed the public policy argument, the trial court did not
address this argument in granting summary judgment in favor of C&J, instead relying
solely on the C&J's causation argument. Accordingly, Slusher and Barrett will likewise
limit their discussion on appeal to the causation grounds relied upon by the trial court.
4

That C&J only contested causation in the summary judgment motion is made clear
by C&J's own admission: "the fundamental issue before the Court on this motion for
summary judgment is whether or not the defendants [Slusher and Barrett] can prove
causation. . . . The issue raised by the motion is not whether or not Humphreys [LRH]
breached a duty to Slusher or Barrett
" (R. 724.)
5

States Supreme Court; and (c) whether C&J's failure to inform Barrett, C&J's co-counsel
in the case, of State Farm's November 2001 settlement offer before rejecting it deprived
Slusher and the other clients of a settlement opportunity. (R. 507-23.)
Notwithstanding the well established principle that causation is "a highly factsensitive element" in Utah, Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1291
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), the trial court granted C&J's motion for summary judgment based
on lack of causation. (R. 988-94.) (Attached as Addendum A.)
Subsequently, on April 3, 2006, Barrett and Slusher filed a Rule 59 Motion to
Alter and Amend the Summary Judgment. The grounds for this motion were: (1) the
trial court erred in relying on a December 7, 2001 agreement to insulate against
malpractice occurring in November 2001; (2) C&J itself recognized the possibility of one
client individually settling his or her interest in the judgment directly with State Farm or
through a litigation-financing company in a January 30, 2001 letter to the clients; (3) the
Court ignored deposition testimony from State Farm's counsel, Michael D. Zimmerman,
indicating State Farm would have discussed individualized settlement and entertained
counteroffers to its November 2001 settlement offer; and (4) any agreement requiring the
unanimous consent of all clients to settle entered into prior to the settlement offer was
invalid as it violated Rule 1.8(g) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and C&J's
fiduciary duty of loyalty to Slusher. (R. 1477-1538; 2063-78.)
The trial court denied the Rule 59 Motion without oral argument by minute entry
dated July 18, 2006. (R. 2090-92.) Final order on the Rule 59 Motion was entered on
October 10, 2006. (R. 2093-96; attached as Addendum B.)
6

2.

Division of Attorney Fees.

The claims and counterclaims comprising the attorney-fee dispute revolved around
two separate contracts: (1) a December 6, 1984 contingency fee representation
agreement for equal split by the attorneys of any contingency fee award (r. 21-24); and
(2) an October 10, 1990 letter agreement, amending the 1984 agreement, providing C&J
with two-thirds and Barrett with one-third of any contingent fee arising out of sums
obtained by the Clients from State Farm (collectively, "the attorney fee contracts," unless
otherwise indicated). (R. 26-27.) The attorney-fee claims were presented to a jury
between April 4 and 6, 2006. (R. 2098.)
The jury returned a verdict against Barrett, finding the attorney fee contracts were
valid and enforceable, but that Barrett failed to perform under the contracts and that C&J
did not unreasonably interfere with Barrett's performance. (R.2098-99.)
Based upon a pretrial motion in limine (r. 1198-1200), the trial court precluded the
jury from deciding the attorney-fee claims based on equitable principles, such as quantum
meruit, rather than on the attorney fee contracts. (R. 1613; 2099.) As such, the trial court
expressly reserved for its sole consideration whether and to what extent Barrett was
entitled to attorney fees on equitable grounds, in the event the jury determined he was not
entitled to the full amount of fees under the contract—$1,600,000. {Id.)
Both sides briefed the issue for decision by the trial court, with Barrett requesting
an equitable award of approximately $800,000 based upon his role in bringing Slusher
into the representation, keeping the State Farm litigation group together, and over 1,050
hours of legal work to contribute to the State Farm litigation. (R. 1756-1810; 2049-59.)
7

C&J estimated the value of Barrett's services to be far less, setting the mark at $21,350,
or less than 0.45% of the total fees recovered and retained by C&J. (R. 1968-2035.)
The trial court awarded Barrett $25,000 in fees. (The Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, r. 2097-2103, and Memorandum Decision, r. 2083-88, are attached
as Addendums C and D, respectively.) In making this award, the trial court used a
measure that was based on Barrett's hours and contribution to the case. (R. 2099-2102.)
The trial court did not, however, consider the historical arrangements between the parties
nor provide any indication as to how it arrived at the $25,000-figure or why it awarded
this amount (as opposed to $0 or $800,000), other than to say it considered "the evidence
adduced, and weigh[ed] all of the equities and other relevant considerations." (R. 2101.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Malpractice Counterclaims
1.

By an agreement dated December 6, 1984, Barrett and C&J agreed to act as

co-counsel in representing Curtis Campbell, Slusher and the Ospitals in a bad faith action
against State Farm. (R. 338-41.) Under the agreement, Slusher and the Ospitals were to
receive 45% of the recovery each, while Mr. Campbell was to receive 10%. The attorney
fees were to be based on a contingency fee of 33% of any recovery, and 40% in the event
of an appeal, plus expenses and costs. (R. 340) (Attached as Addendum E.)
2.

At all material times, Slusher was Barrett's client before, during and after

the other clients joined in the group representation to pursue State Farm. Barrett first
represented Slusher in a 1981 litigation against Mr. Campbell and the Ospitals arising out
of an accident in which Slusher was severely injured and nearly died. In that litigation,
8

Barrett obtained a $200,000 jury verdict against Mr. Campbell for Slusher.5 C&J and
LRH represented the Ospitals, who cross-claimed against Mr. Campbell, and received a
$51,845.68 jury verdict against the Mr. Campbell. (R. 338; 549; 555.)
3.

Slusher entered into the 1984 joint-representation agreement, upon the

advice of Barrett and the request of Mr. Campbell, in lieu of executing on the judgment
obtained against Mr. Campbell in the automobile accident litigation which would have
forced the Campbells into bankruptcy and endangered their home. (R. 555-56; 1872-73.)
4.

Curtis Campbell's wife, Inez Campbell, was not a party to the 1984 joint-

representation agreement, but was later added to the litigation group through a 1995 oral
agreement. (R. 353-54; 561-62.) C&J initially began representing Mrs. Campbell,
without the knowledge and consent of Barrett or Slusher, despite clear and inherent
conflicts that were not disclosed to the Clients at the time. (R. 561-62; 689; 952-53.) For
example, on January 24, 1994, LRH signed a contingency fee agreement with only Mrs.
Campbell, which was separate from the 1984 joint representation agreement with the rest
of the Clients, providing C&J with 33% of her recovery (r. 633.), even though, at the
time, she was not entitled to any recovery under the 1984 joint-representation agreement
(45% went to Slusher and the Ospitals each, and 10% went to Mr. Campbell). (R. 339.)
Later, LRH favored Mrs. Campbell against the other Clients by insisting she get half of
any recovery. (R. 561-62; 689; 952-53.) In a December 3, 2001 letter, LRH
acknowledged that the addition of Mrs. Campbell to the group "created potential conflicts
5

As represented in the 1984 agreement, the trial court reduced the jury verdict to
$133,098.25, giving credit to State Farm for the approximately $67,000.00 settlement
paid by the Ospitals' insurer. (R. 338.)
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of interests among the parties." (R. 638) (Attached as Addendum F.) In fact, Slusher so
resented LRH's insistence that Mrs. Campbell be admitted to the group, as it would
endanger his 45% recovery, that he seriously considered withdrawing from the group,
and even discussed the possibility with another lawyer, before Barrett helped convince
him to remain in the group. (R.689.) His fears were correct, as the Campbells ultimately
received a one-third share. (Id.) This is another instance of C&J's malpractice.6
5.

In 1995 and 1996, two bifurcated trials resulted in a jury verdict of

$2,600,000in compensatory damages and $145,000,000 in punitive damages. (R. 354.)
6.

Subsequently, the trial court reduced the verdict to $26,000,000. Both State

Farm and the Clients appealed from this decision. (R. 354; 496.)
7.

On October 19, 2001, in Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2001

UT 89, 65 P.3d 1134, the Utah Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the original jury
verdict concerning punitive damages to the sum of $145,000,000 (Id.)
8.

On November 14, 2001, State Farm mailed a written offer of settlement,

prepared by its counsel, Michael D. Zimmerman, to LRH for the benefit and response of
the Clients ("Settlement Offer Letter"). (R. 343-44) (Attached as Addendum G.)
9.

In the Settlement Offer Letter, State Farm informed LRH that it wanted to

settle the case "before the Utah Supreme Court rules on State Farm's soon to be filed
petition for rehearing," further advising LRH that "if the case is not settled, State Farm
intends to file a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court." (R. 343.)
6

Neither Slusher nor Barrett was provided a copy of this agreement until discovery
in the present case, despite the clear conflict of interest the agreement provided. Slusher
was never advised by LRH of the conflict and was asked to provide a waiver.
10

10.

State Farm proposed settlement on the following terms:
(i) State Farm will immediately escrow the sum of
$150,000,000, to be paid to you and your clients upon the
Utah Supreme Court's vacating the opinion and decision
issued on October 19, 2001.
(ii) you and your clients will join State Farm in filing with
the Utah Supreme Court a notice, pursuant to Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 37, that the matter has been settled in its
entirety and is now moot, as well as a request that the court
vacate its opinion and decision in the matter.

(Id.) State Farm requested a written response by noon on November 16, 2001. (Id.)
11.

At the time LRH received State Farm's Settlement Offer Letter, the Utah

Supreme Court's 2001 State Farm decision was not final and was subject to further
review, consideration, and could possibly be vacated in accordance with the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure. (Utah R. App. P. 35, 37) (R. 539.)
12.

LRH asserts that he did not receive the Settlement Offer Letter until 10:00

a.m. on November 16, 2001. (R. 531.) However, he had had previous oral conversations
with Mr. Zimmerman regarding settlement (r. 486), the exact terms of which he did not
communicate to Slusher, at least, until November 16, 2001. (R 385.)
13.

After receiving and reviewing Settlement Offer Letter on November 16,

2001, LRH first phoned Mrs. Campbell. After a discussion of the offer, Mrs. Campbell
informed LRH that she would not consent to the terms relating to vacating the Utah
Supreme Court decision and instructed LRH not to accept the offer. Her principal reason
was she did not want the decision to be vacated in the public records. (R. 531-32.)
14.

LRH, on November 16, 2001, next called the Ospitals by telephone to

11

discuss the Settlement Offer Letter. After discussing the offer with the Ospitals, the
Ospitals instructed LRH they would not accept the conditions of the State Farm offer
requiring the Utah Supreme Court decision be vacated. (R. 533.)
15.

LRH next phoned Slusher on November 16, 2001 and generally discussed

the terms of the State Farm offer, but further informed Slusher that both Mrs. Campbell
and the Ospitals were rejecting the State Farm offer based upon the condition that the
Clients would have to join State Farm in filing a motion to vacate the decision and
opinion of the Utah Supreme Court. LRH reminded Slusher that the Clients had
previously agreed that the acceptance of any settlement would have to be unanimous and
since both the Campbells and the Ospitals had rejected the State Farm offer, it did not
matter what Slusher's position was with respect to the State Farm offer. Accordingly,
LRH informed Slusher that the State Farm offer contained in the Settlement Offer Letter
could not and would not be accepted. (R. 533-35; 549-52; 951.)
16.

Slusher did not consent for LRH to reject State Farm's offer and did not

"tell him to agree to reject Mr. Zimmerman's offer." (R. 662; see also 665.)
17.

The "unanimous-consent" agreement LRH was referring to was purportedly

entered into orally by the Clients in September 1995—before the initial bad-faith jury
trial against State Farm even took place. The September 1995 agreement was formally
memorialized on December 7, 2001, three-weeks after State Farm's Settlement Offer
Letter was sent to and rejected by LRH. (R. 375-78; 638.)
18.

Despite the fact that Barrett was counsel of record and Slusher's personal

counsel, C&J and LRH failed to contact Barrett on November 16, 2001 to notify Barrett
12

of the receipt, terms and conditions of the Settlement Offer Letter. (R. 559-61.)
19.

LRH's November 16, 2001 communications with the Clients about the

offer were by telephone and consisted of approximately two hours time. (R. 531-35.)
20.

Despite the fact that LRH did not receive the offer until November 16,

2001—the day mandated by State Farm for a "respon[se]"—LRH and C&J did not at any
time request additional time from State Farm to discuss, process and fully vet the
Settlement Offer Letter with the Clients or with Barrett. (R. 536; 541-42.)
21.

LRH and C&J did not contact Mr. Zimmerman regarding the Settlement

Offer Letter on November 16, 2001 or any time thereafter to seek clarification of State
Farm's settlement offer, including (1) the vacatur condition; (2) what the Clients and
their attorneys could state privately and publicly about State Farm's underlying conduct
forming the basis for the punitive damages award if the Utah Supreme Court decision
was vacated; or (3) whether any variation of or continuing negotiations regarding State
Farm's settlement offer were possible. (R. 539-42.)
22.

C&J did not attempt a single counteroffer to State Farm (r. 638), despite

LRH's admission that Slusher wanted him to at least counteroffer (r. 454), if not accept.
23.

Mr. Zimmerman never informed LRH or C&J that State Farm would not

continue to negotiate the State Farm offer or not negotiate in good faith with any one of
the clients on an individual basis. (R. 678.) In fact, Mr. Zimmerman testified that the
only client LRH ever discussed was Mrs. Campbell. (R. 679.)
24.

Prior to rejecting the offer, LRH and C&J did not adequately discuss with

Slusher or the other Clients, on or after November 16, 2001, that the effects of a reversal
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of the 2001 Campell decision by either the Utah Supreme Court on rehearing or the U.S.
Supreme Court on certiorari would have a similar effect to vacating it. (R. 447-56.)
25.

According to Mr. Zimmerman, State Farm's sole intent in seeking vacation

of the decision was to prevent it as serving as collateral estoppel in other bad-faith cases
in which State Farm was or could be involved. State Farm was not seeking a "gag-order"
on the facts or history of the litigation. (R. 539-40.)
26.

C&J and LRH did not fully explain to Slusher on November 16, 2001 the

full risks of State Farm's appeal to the United States Supreme Court, including, but not
limited to, the trends and disputes in the state and federal courts throughout the United
States with respect to the constitutionality of large punitive damage awards. (R. 550-52.)
27.

LRH and C&J failed to fully inform Slusher of all of the legal options

available to Slusher on November 16, 2001, including the possibility of contacting
Barrett to discuss State Farm's offer or seeking other independent counsel. LRH and
C&J further failed to inform Slusher on or after November 16, 2001 that he could try to
negotiate separately with State Farm or of the possibility of selling his judgment to a
litigation financing company. (R. 550-52.)
28.

However, several months prior to receiving the November 2001 settlement

offer, on January 30, 2001, in response to an earlier settlement offer from State Farm,
LRH addressed a letter to all of the Clients informing them if any one of the Clients
wanted to take less than a one-third share of their interest in judgment of State Farm,
there were possible ways to approach a litigation financing company that would purchase
their interests on a discounted basis. (R. 1464-67.) (Attached as Addendum H.)
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29.

Barrett submitted a letter to LRH on January 31? 2001 (in response to

LRH's January 30, 2001 letter) indicating to LRH that any settlement arrangements with
State Farm on behalf all of the clients should also consider a partial settlement "should
any one or more of them desire to make." (R. 1469.)
30.

It is clear by the January 30 and 31, 2001 letters of LRH and Barrett that

LRH and C&J were fully aware that one of the alternative remedies for any of the clients
was to seek an individual settlement with State Farm or sell their interest in the award to
a litigation financing company. (R. 1464-67; 1469.)
31.

Without review or approval by Barrett and Slusher, before noon on

November 16, 2001, C&J hand delivered a letter to Mr. Zimmerman rejecting the
proposed settlement and misrepresenting to Mr. Zimmerman that all of the Clients "will
not stipulate to vacating the opinion." (R. 486.)
32.

The rejection letter was thereafter mailed to the Clients and to Barrett. It

included a copy of the November 14, 2001 Settlement Offer Letter from State Farm.
Barrett and Slusher did not receive the letters until the following week. (R. 550-51; 666.)
33.

Upon receiving of the Settlement Offer Letter and reviewing the amount of

the offer, Slusher contacted LRH and expressed extreme dissatisfaction at not being
properly notified by LRH of the material terms of the State Farm offer, including the
amount of the offer. Slusher strongly expressed to LRH that the offer should have been
accepted and he would have agreed with State Farm's settlement offer and conditions if
given the opportunity. At a minimum, Slusher informed LRH that the Clients should
have all met together to fully discuss and debate the Settlement Offer Letter before it was
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rejected by LRH and C&J in a two-hour period. (R. 550-51.)
34.

Barrett visited Slusher in Florida in January 2002 and learned for the first

time that Slusher had not been properly and fully advised of the State Farm offer.
Thereafter, Barrett advised LRH and C&J that both he and Slusher should have been
properly advised of the State Farm offer and given the opportunity to further discuss and
explore settlement options with State Farm and the other Clients. (R. 550-51; 561.)
35.

After and as a result of the rejection of the settlement offer, State Farm filed

its Petition for Rehearing on November 19, 2001. When the Utah Supreme Court
rejected this petition, State Farm, as promised, filed a Petition for Certiorari with the U.S.
Supreme Court. It was granted and the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the $145,000,000.00
punitive damages award and directed the Utah Supreme Court to recalculate the punitive
damages award. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 123 S.Ct.
1513 (2003). Thereafter, the Utah Supreme Court awarded revised punitive damages of
less than $10,000,000.00, before interest. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., 2004 UT 34, 98 P.3d 409.
36.

By November 16, 2001, it was apparent to C&J and LRH that Slusher's

legal interests and goals were diametrically opposed to and conflicted with the
Campbells', the Ospitals', C&J's, and LRH's. Mrs. Campbell and the Ospitals were not
injured in the underlying 1981 automobile accident that gave rise to the bad faith claims
against State Farm, and were primarily concerned with punishing State Farm for their bad
faith conduct. (R. 551; 581-83; 1531-38.)
37.

Similarly, LRH and C&J were interested in the public notoriety of the Utah
16

Supreme Court's 2001 opinion and did not wish the opinion to be vacated. LRH told
Slusher and the press that he did not care about the money as much as punishing State
Farm. (R. 665; 1531-38) LRH and C&J were marketing themselves as specialists in
insurance law and in bad faith cases against insurance companies. The 2001 State Farm
opinion was of great value to C&J as precedent in their other bad faith cases. (R. 576-82.)
38.

Slusher, on the other hand, was severely injured in the 1981 accident and

continues to experience lifetime physical and mental injuries and suffering. Unlike the
other Clients and C&J, Slusher's primary goals were monetary. (R. 534; 551; 662.)
39.

LRH realized the severe and inherent conflict of interest among the Clients

and Slusher's extreme dissatisfaction with LRH's rejection of the Settlement Offer
shortly after November 16, 2001. This is demonstrated by a December 3, 2001 letter from
LRH to the Clients where LRH acknowledged there were misunderstandings, confusion
and a lack of communication between the Clients regarding each Client's settlement
desires. (R. 638; Addendum F.) Indeed, to avoid future confusions, LRH requested in the
letter that each Client "communicate with me in writing regarding your decisions and/or
proposals regarding settlement." (Id.) Also in this letter, LRH first proposed that the
Clients formally memorialize their oral 1995 agreement to evenly split all recoveries and
unanimously settle all cases, (id.), which became the December 7, 2001 agreement.
40.

There is no evidence that C&J or LRH ever received a conflict waiver from

any of the Clients, despite the overwhelming need for one. (R. 578-83; 683.)
41.

The settlement of a multi-million dollar contingent liability by State Farm

in 2001, as could have been accomplished by settling individually with any or some of
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the Clients, would have been of great value and financial importance to State Farm as a
public company responsible financially to its equity shareholders. (R. 1470-75.)
Attorney-Fee Claims
42.

As indicated, on December 6, 1984, C&J and Barrett entered into an

agreement wherein they agreed to jointly represent Slusher, the Ospitals and Mr. Cambell
on a contingency fee basis with an equal division of attorney fees between Barrett and
C&J of 33% or, in the event of appeal, 40% of the clients' recovery. (R. 338-41.)
43.

At the time, Barrett had obtained a $200,000 judgment against Mr.

Campbell (reduced by the trial court to $133,098.25, see footnote 5, supra) and C&J
obtained a $51,845.68 judgment against Mr. Campbell. Thus, Barrett agreed to an equal
division despite having 72% of the claim against Campbell. (R. 338; 549; 555.)
44.

Sometime after entering into the 1984 Agreement, LRH became the lead

attorney for all the Clients in the State Farm Litigation. Barrett was to be subordinate
counsel, to provide assistance to LRH and C&J when requested. (R. 1817; 1875.)
45.

This situation was later memorialized in a signed letter agreement dated

October 10, 1990 between only LRH and Barrett, prepared by LRH, providing:
This will confirm our agreement and understanding
concerning the split of attorney fees relating to this action.
Given the present posture of the case and our respective
involvements, we agreed that an equitable split of the
attorneys fees would be an apportionment of 2/3 of the fee
to [C&J], and 1/3 to your [Barrett's] office. You [Barrett]
would continue to render some assistance in this case and I
[LRH] would continue to be lead counsel.
(R. 335-336.) (Emphasis added.) (Attached as Addendum I.)
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46.

Although Slusher thought Barrett had performed his obligations to "render

some assistance," (r. 335; 1874, 1879-80), the jury found that while an enforceable
contract existed, Barrett had failed to perform as required and, therefore, was not entitled
to a one-third share of the reduced recovery—approximately $1,600,000. (R. 2098-99.)
47.

Pursuant to a pretrial ruling, Barrett's entitlement to and the amount of the

equitable award was briefed by the parties for decision by the trial court. (R. 1198-1200;
1613; 2099.) Barrett argued the value of the benefit he contributed to the representation
was $800,000, (r. 1756-1810), while C&J argued it was $21,350—less than 0.45% of the
fees recovered and retained by C&J. (R. 1968-2035.)
48.

The trial chose not to follow either party's recommended amount and

instead awarded Barrett $25,000. (R. 2102; 2105; Addendum C) However, the trial court
appears to have followed C&J's suggestion to give Barrett his fees "proportionate to his
effort and contribution to the work necessary to pursue the State Farm claim." (R. 2084.)
49.

In making its $25,000 award, the trial court relied on trial testimony and

evidence establishing a comparatively greater amount of work performed by C&J in the
State Farm case (r. 2083-88; 2097-2103), and specifically listed the following factors as
the bases for its decision:
a.

Its observation, "Whether judged by the standard of unjust

enrichment, actual services rendered, or by any other reasonable amount, Barrett's
contribution to the prosecution of the Campbell v. State Farm case was minimal." (R.
2099.)
b.

Barrett attended only two of the almost 100 depositions taken in the
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Campbell case, and actively participated in none of them. {Id.)
c.

Barrett prepared one pleading, i.e., one motion to compel and

supporting memorandum, out of the many hundreds of pages of pleadings filed. (R. 2100)
d.

Barrett did not appear by counsel at any of the many hours and days

of pre-trial or post-trial hearings, or during either of the ten week bifurcated trials. {Id.)
e.

Barrett advanced none of the more than $500,000.00 out-of-pocket

expenses advanced by C&J that were necessary for the prosecution of the case, despite
Barrett's wherewithal to do so, his awareness of the need to advance such costs, and the
Campbells' financial inability to do so. As such, C&J alone also bore the risk of losing
these costs if the case against State Farm was lost. {Id.)
f.

C&J was required to spend a large amount of time doing the work

Barrett failed to do. {Id.)
g.

Trial testimony of Barrett and other evidence revealed he lacked an

understanding of the fundamental matters involved in the State Farm case, such as the
distinction between first and third party bad faith claims, the names of key witnesses, or
content of important exhibits and pleadings. {Id.)
h.

Barrett played no role in the four appeals in the case. (R. 2101.)

i.

Barrett's role as spectator did not advance the case in any material

j.

Any contribution Barrett may have made in keeping Slusher in the

way. {Id.)

group was of minimal value because Barrett may not "hand[]-off' clients and he is not
entitled to a "finder's fee." Slusher's interest in the State Farm case was limited to a
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contractual right to share in the proceeds, which was entirely dependant on the success of
the Campbells' claims. The Campbells' ultimate success was the result of the financial
resources and professional services of C&J. Slusher received almost $3,000,000 from his
contractual rights and the full amount (plus interest) of the personal injury judgment in
his favor against Mr. Campbell in the underlying automobile accident case. (R. 2101-02.)
50.

In light of these factors, "and weighing all of the equities and other relevant

considerations, the Court determines that $25,000.00 represents a fair, reasonable and
equitable amount fully compensating Barrett for all of [his] professional services . . . as
well as for the value which he brought and/or added to the case. {Id.)
51.

Notably, the trial court did not ascribe a single dollar value to any of these

factors or in any way establish how it arrived at $25,000.00 as opposed to some other
figure. (R. 2097-2104.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The key question to be decided in the malpractice portion of this appeal is whether
a law firm should, as a matter of law, be able to use its own malpractice and the guise of
speculative causation to shield itself from malpractice liability. For the purposes of the
summary judgment motion, C&J conceded there are at least material issues of fact as to
whether it breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty to Slusher by representing multiple
clients with clearly conflicting interests and by subordinating Slusher's desires to settle
his interest in the State Farm litigation to the desires of C&J and the rest of the litigation
group. Similarly, for the purposes of its summary judgment motion, C&J conceded there
are fact issues as to whether it breached its contract with Slusher and its professional duty
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of care by rejecting State Farm's November 14, 2001 Settlement Offer for $150,000,000
after only two-hours of consideration, and no investigation, discussion with State Farm,
or any counteroffers. C&J has also conceded the existence of fact issues as to damages.
C&J argued only that Barrett and Slusher cannot establish causation, as a matter of
law, because it is unduly speculative. However, under Utah law causation is highly factsensitive. There are ample facts in the record demonstrating that but for C&J's
malpractice and breach of the duty of loyalty, Slusher likely would have settled his
interest in the State Farm litigation, either through direct negotiation with State Farm or a
litigation finance company.
Nevertheless, C&J has sought to hide these facts under its own malpractice. For
example, C&J first relied on an agreement it drafted between the clients requiring
unanimous consent to any settlement. Following this agreement, because the Campbells
and Ospitals did not agree to the vacatur condition of State Farm's settlement offer, C&J
told Slusher that State Farm's offer could not and would not be accepted, regardless of
his desires. However, C&J has failed to acknowledge that both its advice to Slusher and
its use of this agreement to prevent Slusher from individually settling his interest are,
themselves, instances of malpractice as they deprived Slusher of his absolute right to
determine whether or not he settled his interest in the case. This agreement could not,
then, serve as an intervening cause to defeat causation as a matter of law.
C&J next argued that causation was lacking because State Farm would not
individually settle with Slusher as he was not a named party to the suit. However, this
ignores Slusher's clear 1/3 interest in the outcome of the litigation and the fact that prior
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to the November 14, 2001 Settlement Offer, through a January 30, 2001 letter, C&J
acknowledged Slusher's rights to individually settle directly with State Farm or by
assigning his interest to a litigation financing company. C&J's malpractice in failing to
present these options in the context of an actual offer is what caused Slusher not to settle
individually, not the absence of his name on the caption.
C&J also argued that Slusher could not have accepted the Settlement Offer
because it was contingent on this Court vacating its 2001 State Farm opinion, which this
Court would not do as a matter of law. This argument ignores that if C&J fulfilled their
duties, vacatur may never have been an issue. For example, if Slusher had been advised
about settling his interest prior to C&J rejecting the offer, and thus settled, the actual
event of vacatur would be irrelevant as to him. Furthermore, had C&J even attempted to
negotiate with State Farm, the vacatur condition could have been removed. Finally,
under the wording of the State Farm's offer, by the time the Court considered vacatur on
joint motion of the parties, the offer would have already been accepted.
Regarding the attorney-fee dispute, the trial court failed to ascribe any dollar
figure to his findings or demonstrate how its award of $25,000, as opposed to some other
amount, "follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence." Parduhn v. Bennett,
2005 UT 22,T|24, 112 P.3d 495. The trial court further failed to consider the historical
relationship between the parties and the October 1990 letter agreement, in which Barrett
and LRH had already readjusted their respective expectations for the representation from
a 50-50 split to a 1/3-2/3 split in favor of C&J, determining this would be "equitable"
given the "present posture of the case" and their "respective involvements." (R. 335.)
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Thus, the trial court erred by using an incorrect measure to determine its equitable award.
ARGUMENT
MALPRACTICE COUNTERCLAIMS
I.

Summary Judgment Standard
As explained in detail below, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment

for C&J because genuine and significant issues of fact regarding causation exist and
remain in dispute. "Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Price Dev. Co., L.P. v. Orem City, 2000 UT 26,lj9, 995 P.2d 1237 (citing Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c)). In ruling on or reviewing a grant of summary judgment, Utah courts "'view the
facts, including all inferences arising from those facts, in a light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion and will allow the summary judgment to stand only if the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts.'" Kilpatrick v.
Wiley, Rein and Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted).
"'[D]oubts about whether a nonmovant has established a genuine issue of material fact
should be resolved in favor of permitting the party to go to trial.'" Id. (citation omitted).
II.

MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST AS TO WHETHER C&J'S
LEGAL MALPRACTICE AND BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
CAUSED DAMAGE TO SLUSHER AND BARRETT RELATED TO
THE LOSS OF A SETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITY.

A.

Overview

"Legal malpractice is a generic term for at least three distinct causes of action
available to clients who suffer damages because of their lawyers' misbehavior": (1)
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breach of fiduciary duty, (2) negligence, and (3) breach of contract. Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d
at 1289. Regardless of the type of legal malpractice action the plaintiff brings, however,
"the central purpose of the law of legal malpractice is to guard against and to remedy
exploitation of the power lawyers possess over their clients' lives and property." Id.
A claim for legal malpractice based on breach of fiduciary duty recognizes that
"[a]s fiduciaries, attorneys have a legal duty 'to represent the client with undivided
loyalty, to preserve the clients confidences, and to disclose any material matters bearing
upon the representation [of the client].5" Id. at 1290 (alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted); accord Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933, 936
(1962) (observing u[w]here an attorney is hired solely to represent the interest of a client,
his fiduciary duty is of the highest order and he must not represent interests adverse to
those of the client"). The elements of a claim for legal malpractice based on breach of
fiduciary duty are: "(1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) breach of the attorney's
fiduciary duty to the client; (3) causation, both actual and proximate; and (4) damages
suffered by the client." Kilpatrick 909 P.2d at 1290.
Legal malpractice based on negligence focuses on the "standard of care,"
Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1290; that is, "the failure of an attorney to use such skill,
prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and

7

There appears to be no Utah authority expressly listing the elements for a claim for
legal malpractice based on breach of contract. However, in Kilpatrick the Court of
Appeals made clear that causation is an element of legal malpractice based on contract.
Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1291. Because C&J's motion and the trial court's decision
granting summary judgment focused entirely on causation, for brevity Slusher's
malpractice claims based on breach of contract will not be separately analyzed here.
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exercise in the performance of the tasks which they undertake." Dunn v. McKay, Burton,
McMurray, and Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 902-03 (Maughn, J. dissenting) (quotations and
citation omitted). The elements of legal malpractice based on negligence are: (1) an
attorney-client relationship; (2) a duty of the attorney to the client; (3) a breach of that
duty; and (4) damages suffered by the client proximately caused by the attorney's breach
of duty. Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
In the present case, Barrett and Slusher have brought all three types of legal
malpractice claims, each of which seek redress for C&J's simultaneous representation of
multiple clients with adverse interests and other inappropriate conduct in rejecting State
Farm's November 14, 2001 Settlement Offer Letter.8 These conflicting interests are
simply stated: Slusher, who was severely injured in the underlying automobile accident,
primarily sought as much monetary relief from State Farm as possible; he was not
concerned about preserving precedent. Mrs. Campbell, the Ospitals and C&J, on the
other hand, were not injured in the underlying accident and were primarily interested in
publicly exposing State Farm's conduct through the 2001 Utah Supreme Court opinion.
C&J ignored this clear conflict of interest between and among the clients and itself and,
in the process, violated its fiduciary duty of loyalty to Slusher and acted in bad faith by9:

Q

Although Barrett and Slusher have separate claims for malpractice and breach of
fiduciary duty, because Barrett's and Slusher's interests are aligned, and Barrett's right to
recovery is derivative of Slusher's, for the remainder of the malpractice section of this
brief, in the interest of brevity, both Barrett and Slusher will be referred to collectively, as
"Slusher," unless otherwise indicated.
9

Each of these asserted breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty and breaches of
the standard of care and contract (listed on pages 27-28) were set forth in Barrett's &
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•

Ignoring and refusing to abide by Slusher's desires regarding settlement.
Specifically, instead of honoring or even trying to honor Slusher's absolute right
and decision to settle his interest in the litigation in November 2001, see Utah R.
Prof 1 Conduct 1.2, C&J told Slusher that in 1995—before the underlying bad
faith trial occurred—he had agreed that all settlements must be unanimous and,
thus, because the Campbells and the Ospitals did not wish to accept the vacatur
condition and settle with State Farm, the case could not and would not be settled
regardless of what Slusher wanted.

•

Simultaneously representing clients with adverse and conflicting interests to
Slusher's interests.

•

Putting the interests of the other clients of the litigation group and the interests of
the law firm itself (in building its bad faith litigation practice and preserving
favorable precedent) above Slusher's own interests regarding settlement and
forcing Slusher to abide by the group's decision regarding settlement.
Slusher has further asserted that C&J breached its professional standard of care

and its attorney-client contract with Slusher by, among other things:
•

Failing to obtain more time or further negotiate the offer with State Farm, and
instead rejecting it after consideration of only a few hours. This breach includes
failing to discuss individualized settlements with Mr. Zimmerman despite earlier
acknowledging the possibility and misrepresenting that none of the clients would
accept a settlement offer conditioned upon vacatur.

•

Failing to advise Barrett, co-counsel for the clients and Slusher's trusted personal
counsel, of the settlement offer before rejecting it, thereby depriving Slusher and
the rest of the Clients of the benefit of Barrett's counsel.

•

Failing to fully explain the risks of rejecting the State Farm offer to the Clients,
including the possibility of appeal, and the effects of a reversal of the Utah
Supreme Court's 2001 State Farm decision.

•

Failing to investigate the intent, purpose and meaning of certain terms of State
Farm's Settlement Offer, including the vacatur term and thus failing to fully
inform and advise the clients regarding these terms so they could make an
informed decision as to whether to accept or reject the offer.

Slusher's Amended Counterclaim (r. 315-331) and/or their opposition to summary
judgment. (R. 514-16 and Motion to Amend the Summary Judgment. (R. 1477-1538.)
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•

Failing to disclose to the Clients that even in the event of vacatur the Utah
Supreme Court opinion would be publicly available but would not provide
collateral estoppel in other cases. Further failing to inform the Clients that State
Farm was not seeking a "gag-order" from the Clients.

•

Binding the Clients to an agreement requiring their unanimous consent to any
settlement and refusing to advise the Clients, after receiving State Farm's
November 14, 2001 Settlement Offer, that each of the Client's retained the right to
explore individual settlement with State Farm or assign their interest in the
litigation to a third party or litigation financing company.

•

Failing to explore alternatives to group settlement, including individual settlement
and/or the use of a litigation financing company, with the Clients.
For the purposes of this summary judgment motion, C&J conceded that there are

at least factual issues as to (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship; (2) whether
it breached its fiduciary duties of loyalty, its professional duties of care, and its contract
with Slusher; and (3) whether Slusher suffered damage. Accordingly, the only question
before the trial court, and now before this Court, is whether there are any issues of fact as
to whether C&J's malpractice in refusing to abide by Slusher's desires regarding
settlement and negligence in responding to the offer caused Slusher to lose an
opportunity to settle his interest in the State Farm litigation.
B.

Causation is a Question of Fact.

"Causation is a highly fact-sensitive element of any cause of action." Kilpatrick,
909 P.2d at 1292. "Generally, causation 'cannot be resolved as a matter of law.'" Id.
(quoting Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 106 (Utah 1992)); accord Harline, 854 P.2d
at 600 ("Proximate cause is an issue of fact. Thus, only if there is no evidence upon
which a reasonable jury could infer causation, is summary judgment appropriate."). "In
other words, Utah litigants do not easily dispose of the element of causation on summary
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judgment." Kilpatrick 909 P.2d at 1292.
There are two types of causation that malpractice plaintiffs must demonstrate to
prevail on their claim: "actual cause—that but for an attorney's wrong their loss would
not have occurred—and proximate cause—that a reasonable likelihood exists that they
would have ultimately benefited." Id. at 1291. Notwithstanding the fact-based nature of
the causation inquiry, "causation or the connection between fault and damages in legal
malpractice actions 'cannot properly be based on speculation or conjecture.5" Id.
(citation omitted). Unfortunately, this proviso has created a perceived safe harbor for
malpracticing attorneys to avoid the scrutiny of the jury and, indeed, served as the basis
for C&J's motion for summary judgment here.
Although the Kilpatrick decision does not seek to define what constitutes unduly
speculative causation in legal malpractice, its facts are instructive as to what conduct does
not. In Kilpatrick, prospective purchasers and operators of a television station
("plaintiffs") brought suit against their attorney and his law firm (collectively, "law
firm") for apparent conflicts of interest and breach of fiduciary duties. Id, at 1286.
Plaintiffs hired the law firm, a specialist in communications law, to represent them in
their effort to purchase and operate television Channel 13. Id. Five applicants, including
plaintiffs, were vying for the Channel 13 license. Id. The law firm advised plaintiffs to
buy-out the competition and began seeking a financing partner. Id.
Subsequently, while still representing plaintiffs, the law firm acquired several
other clients whose interests conflicted with plaintiffs, including one client who owned
television Channel 20 ("Adams") and another client ("Northstar") who also sought to
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acquire Channel 13. Id. Although the law firm recognized the conflict of interest,
because Northstar was the more lucrative and preferred client, the law firm continued to
represent Northstar. Id. at 1287.
Thus when Northstar and another investor ("CPL") presented plaintiffs with
identical financing bids to enable plaintiffs to buy out other applicants—ten million
dollars for sixty percent interest in Channel 13—the law firm advised plaintiffs to accept
Northstar's offer. Id. Thereafter, plaintiffs formed a limited partnership with Northstar
("MWT"). Id. at 1288. The limited partnership agreement, which was drafted by the law
firm, was disproportionately beneficial to Northstar. Id.
Following execution of the limited partnership agreement, law firm substituted
MWT for plaintiffs as a Channel 13 applicant and advised plaintiffs to buy Channel 20
from Adams, another of the law firm's clients, for thirty million dollars, rather than
compete with Channel 20. Id. Plaintiffs acquiesced after Northstar threatened to
withdraw funds.
MWT subsequently sold Channel 13 to Fox, against plaintiffs wishes. Id. MWT,
along with Northstar and plaintiffs, were represented by the law firm in the deal. Id.
Plaintiffs received no money from the sale and were in fact obligated, to pay Northstar
over two-million dollars. Id. at 1288-89.
Plaintiffs filed suit against the law firm for malpractice alleging "that had
Northstar honored its original commitment for ten million dollars and had Channel 13
gone into direct competition with Channel 20 rather than buying out Channel 20,
plaintiffs' interest in Channel 13 would have been worth approximately twenty million
30

dollars." Id. at 1289. Thus, plaintiffs sought damages in that amount. Id.
The law firm moved for summary judgment, arguing only that plaintiffs could not
establish causation. Id. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment. Id.
The Court of Appeals reversed. The court first observed that to establish causation
in a legal malpractice action based on breach of fiduciary duty, "clients must show that if
the attorney had adhered to the ordinary standards of profession conduct and had not
breached fiduciary duties, the client would have benefited." Id. at 1291. The trial court
misapplied this standard, however, by weighing the evidence before it. See id. at 1292.
Specifically, the plaintiffs presented evidence suggesting:
had defendant [law firm] not breached its duty of loyalty, they
would have accepted CPL's financing commitment instead of
Northstar's financing commitment and would have benefited
from that choice[; and]

had defendant not breached its duty of loyalty, Channel 13
likely would have gone into direct competition with, rather
than purchased, Channel 20, and plaintiffs would have
benefited from that choice.
Id. While the court observed that under these facts and stage of the litigation "plaintiffs
causation theory may appear somewhat strained," the court concluded that "it is the
province of the jury . . . to determine whether the causation theory is fatally attenuated."
Id. (alteration in original) (quotations and citation omitted).
The same result is required here as many factual issues surround whether C&J's
breaches of loyalty and care were the actual and proximate cause of Slusher's injuries.
Slusher has consistently maintained, since the time of State Farm's November 14, 2001
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offer, that he wanted to settle his interest in the litigation; that he "didn't tell [C&J] to
reject Mr. Zimmerman's offer," (r. 662); and that, unlike the Campbells, and the
Ospitals, monetary compensation was more important to him than the continued vitality
of the opinion. Rather than honor Slusher's desires to settle, however, C&J subverted his
interests to the conflicting interests of the other clients and C&J's own interests. As
indicated, for the purposes of it summary judgment motion, C&J admitted this is a breach
of its "duty to represent [Slusher] with undivided loyalty." Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1290.
It is clear that this egregious conflict of interest is the actual and proximate cause
of Slusher's lost settlement opportunity. Given Slusher's desire to settle, the following
facts indicate that settlement of his interests in the State Farm litigation was likely:
•

State Farm indicated a desire and intent to settle through both its November 14,
2001 Settlement Offer letter and earlier settlement offers to C&J. (R.343; 346.)

•

The deposition testimony of Michael Zimmerman, State Farm's counsel, indicates
that State Farm would have continued to negotiate for settlement with the group
and that it would have considered settling with the clients individually if they
broke off from each other. (R. 539-42; 678.)

•

State Farm's Settlement Letter, itself, invited further negotiations by stating that
State Farm would like to settle before the Utah Supreme Court rules on State
Farm's "soon to be filed" petition for rehearing. Although State Farm requested a
response by November 16, 2001, it clearly did not set that as the cut-off date for
negotiations (R.343.)

•

C&J recognized the possibility of individualized settlement and breaking up the
litigation group as early as January 30, 2001—long before the Settlement Offer
Letter was sent and rejected—as demonstrated by LRH's January 30, 2001 letter
to the Clients setting forth alternatives "[i]f less than all of you want to settle."
These alternatives, according to LRH, included approaching State Farm an
offering to settle one-third of the judgment on a compromise basis or one of the
clients assigning his or her interest to a litigation financing company. (R. 1464-67.)

•

The Declaration of Victor L. Lund stating that the any responsible officers and
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directors of a large public company, such as State Farm, would seriously consider
and negotiate for any settlement that reduced its contingent liability by $50 million
or more. (R. 1470-75.)
These facts demonstrate that but for C&J's breach of its duty of loyalty in refusing
to follow Slusher's desires regarding settlement and but for C&J's representation of other
clients with adverse and conflicting interests as of the time of the Settlement Offer Letter,
there is a reasonable probability that Slusher could have settled his interest in the
litigation. Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, this is no more attenuated than the
Kilpatrick plaintiffs' argument that but for the law firm's breaches of the duty of loyalty,
the plaintiffs would have accepted a competing financing offer from CPL and "likely"
would have gone into competition with Channel 20 rather than purchasing it. Kilpatrick,
909 P.2d at 1292. In short, given both Slusher's and State Farm's desire to settle, if C&J
would have honored its duty of loyalty and treated Slusher as if he were C&J's only
client in the representation or informed Slusher to seek the advise of separate counsel, a
settlement or the litigation-financing alternative to settlement would likely have taken
place. Under the standard set forth by Kilpatrick this likelihood is all that is necessary.
Similarly, there are at least material issues of fact as to whether C&J's breach of
the standard of care caused Slusher to miss out on a settlement opportunity. It is difficult
to predict what would have happened but for C&J's breaches of the standard of care; but
C&J should not be rewarded for this difficulty. C&J's breaches, including its haste in
rejecting the offer, its failure to adequately explore and discuss the vacatur condition with
State Farm or the Clients, and its failure to discuss the possible effects of a reversal of the
State Farm decision, clearly deprived Slusher and the rest of the Clients of necessary
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information and alternatives needed to properly evaluate the offer and make an informed
decision to accept or reject it and/or to discuss future offers. Likewise, C&J's improper
binding of the Clients to a unanimous-consent-to-settle agreement deprived the Clients of
their ability to seek individual settlement. Whether and to what extent these breaches
caused damage to Slusher and the rest of Clients requires a weighing of evidence that is
properly the task of the jury, not the trial court on summary judgment. See id.
C.

The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment for C&J
Based on the December 7, 2001 Agreement, the Vacatur Condition, and
on its Opinion that Individual Settlement with Slusher Held No
Advantage for State Farm,

Notwithstanding the clear questions of fact that exist regarding causation, the trial
court concluded that causation was too speculative to go to a jury for three reasons: (1)
the December 7, 2001 agreement "provided that there could be no settlement against
State Farm without the 'united approval' of all three parties," and the Campbells and
Ospitals would not have given their consent to the vacatur element of State Farm's
settlement offer; (2) Slusher was not a party to the State Farm case, so an independent
settlement with State Farm "would have held no cognizable advantage or gain for State
Farm"; and (3) the vacatur condition of State Farm's settlement offer could not be
satisfied because the Utah Supreme Court, as a matter of law, would not have vacated its
State Farm opinion. (R. 990-93.) The trial court erred in relying on these reasons.
1.

The December 7, 2001 Agreement does not defeat causation.

The trial court first concluded that causation was lacking because individual
settlement between Slusher and State Farm "was not permissible under the parties'
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December 7, 2001 Agreement, which required unanimous consent to any settlement."
(R. 991.) This conclusion was wrong for at least four reasons.
First, the trial court's reliance on the December 7, 2001 agreement was factually
incongruous as Slusher's claim for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty are
based on operative errors and omissions that occurred on November 16, 2001. Indeed,
had the asserted malpractice not occurred, Slusher may have never entered into the
December 7, 2001 agreement.10
Second, even if, as the trial court concluded, the December 7, 2001 agreement
merely "formally memorialized" a September 1995 agreement that also required
unanimous consent to settle, this does not make the December 7, 2001 agreement a
legitimate defense to causation. C&J's actions in binding the Clients to such a
"unanimous consent" agreement and C&J's reliance on this agreement in advising
Slusher are, themselves, instances of C&J's malpractice. For example, C&J's reliance on
this agreement violated its professional standard of care because, due to the agreement,
C&J did not explain to Slusher or the other Clients all of their options regarding
settlement with State Farm. Instead C&J , which was irreconcilably conflicted, merely

The timing of the December 7, 2001 Agreement is itself curious. C&J had been
content with an admittedly unmemorialized September 1995 agreement for over six
years, throughout both trial and the state appellate process. What changed? Undoubtedly
Slusher's anger at C&J's rejection of the November 14, 2001 Settlement Offer against his
wishes caused C&J to hurriedly "memorialize" the unanimous consent requirement to
attempt to insulate itself from malpractice liability. Thus, rather than approach State
Farm or a litigation financing company to attempt to pursue settlement for Slusher
following its rejection on November 16, 2001, C&J once again put its own interests
before Slusher's by first drafting a letter to the clients discussing the unanimous-consent
requirement, (r. 638), and then the December 7, 2001 contract. (R. 375-78.)
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informed Slusher that Mrs. Campbell and the Ospitals were refusing the offer and, as
such, regardless of his desires, the offer would be rejected. Thus, rather than serving as
an intervening cause to defeat causation, the agreement itself is a source of malpractice.
The unanimous-consent agreement, as used by C&J in this case, also violated
C&J's duty of loyalty to Slusher in that it improperly abrogated Slusher's individual right
to seek out a separate opportunity to settle individually with State Farm by subjecting him
to the wills of the other Clients. In essence, through this agreement, C&J took from
Slusher the right to control whether or not he settled the case.
The right of each individual client to have exclusive control over the settlement of
his or her interest in a lawsuit is among a client's most fundamental rights and is
protected by Rule 1.2 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.11 This right is so
important that Utah courts have, on at least two separate occasions, held that agreements
between an attorney and a client that deprive the client of control over the settlement of a
lawsuit are void as against public policy. See Potter v. Ajax Mining Co., 22 Utah 273, 61
P. 999, 1003 (1900) and Parents Against Drunk Drivers v. Grayston Pines Homeowners'
Ass'n, 789 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Rule 1.8(g) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct supplements Rule 1.2 in
19

protecting a client's exclusive decision to settle a matter.

Rule 1.8(g) is "a prophylactic

11

The operative part of Rule 1.2 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct was the
same in 2001 as it is now, providing: "A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter." Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct R. 1.2.
12

Rule 1.8(g) was identical in 1995 and 2001, providing: "A lawyer who represents
two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims
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rule designed to protect clients who are represented by the same lawyer and whose claims
or defenses are jointly negotiated and resolved through settlement or by agreement."
ABA Comm. of Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility Formal Op. 06-438 (2006). (Addendum
J.) As explained by the ABA:
As noted in Comment (13) to Rule 1.8, differences in the
willingness of each represented client to make or accept an
offer of settlement are among the risks that should be
considered when a lawyer undertakes to represent multiple
clients in matters where a settlement or plea agreement could
create conflict among them.. . .

Rule 1.8(g) deters lawyers from favoring one client over
another in settlement negotiations by requiring that lawyers
reveal to all clients information relevant to the proposed
settlement. That information empowers each client to
withhold consent and thus prevent the lawyer from
subordinating the interests of the client to those of another
client or to those of the lawyer. Rule 1.8(g) thereby
supplements the lawyer's duties under Rule 1.2(a) to defer to
his clients' roles as ultimate decision-makers concerning the
objectives of the representation, and to abide by his clients'
decisions whether to settle a matter.
ABA Formal Op. 06-438. Importantly, in order to ensure each client's valid and informed
consent to an aggregated settlement, Rule 1.8(g) requires the detailed disclosures from
the lawyer to "be made in the context of a specific offer or demand. Accordingly, the
informed consent required by the rule generally cannot be obtained in advance of the
formulation of such an offer or demand." Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
C&J's argument that Slusher gave up his right in 1995 to individually settle with
of or against the clients . . . unless each client consents after consultation, including
disclosure of the existence and nature of all claims or pleas involved and of the
participation of each person in the settlement." Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 1.8(g).
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State Farm in 2001 violates Rule 1.8(g)'s prohibition against obtaining his informed
consent in advance of the November 14, 2001 settlement offer. Indeed, C&J's position
that Slusher was inextricably and forever bound by that 1995 agreement is particularly
troubling, given that this agreement was made even before the commencement of the jury
trial in the underlying State Farm bad-faith litigation. (R. 354.) It is entirely foreseeable
and reasonable that one of the parties to a litigation group may lose his zest for litigation,
and wish to settle his interest, after over a decade of litigation and the prospect that,
unless settlement occurs, several more years are to follow. However, rather than ask
Slusher whether he wanted to settle his interest or explore alternatives to settlement, such
as through a litigation financing company, C&J merely informed Slusher that the other
Clients had rejected the offer and, thus, so must he. As such, to the extent C&J used the
agreement to deprive Slusher of his exclusive decision to settle the case, C&J committed
malpractice and breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty. For C&J to then attempt to rely on
such an agreement to insulate itself from malpractice liability is contrary to public policy
and such an attempt should be rejected.
Finally, C&J's assertion that in 1995 Slusher gave up his right to individually
settle his interest in the State Farm litigation case is belied by the fact that on January 30,
2001, LRH wrote to the clients and expressly recognized "if less than all of you want to
settle, there are possible alternatives to explore." (R. 1466.) In paragraphs 5 and 6 of this
letter, LRH specified two such alternatives:
[First] We could approach State Farm and suggest that we
would be willing to settle one-third of the judgment on a
compromise basis, stating that only one of the three of you
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desire to settle. State Farm may or may not entertain a partial
settlement proposal. While it may save them money if the
full judgment is affirmed, it does not prevent an adverse
opinion from being published by the Utah Supreme Court
(which may have far more devastating effects).
[Second] If one of you desires to take less than your onethird share, a possible way to address this would be to
approach a litigation-financing company that would pay a
percentage of the judgment to one who desires to settle.
(Id.) Barrett, in a January 31, 2000 letter in response, indicated his assent to go along
with "any partial settlement any one or more of them [clients] decided to make."
(R.1469.) Nonetheless, C&J did not inform the clients of this possibility in responding
to the November 14, 2001 Settlement Offer and did not timely inform Barrett of the
Settlement Offer, so he could explore this possibility on behalf of the Clients. Thus,
C&J's claim that the 1995 agreement forever foreclosed the possibility of individual
settlement is disingenuous at best and does not defeat causation as a matter of law.
2.

Individual settlement with Slusher offered cognizable advantage to
State Farm.
The trial court next held that Slusher's causation argument was unduly speculative

because "Mr. Slusher was not a party to the State Farm case," and thus "an independent
settlement with Mr. Slusher would hold no cognizable advantage or gain for State Farm."
(R. 991.) As an initial matter, the trial court's opinion as to what would be of advantage
to State Farm constitutes a weighing of evidence not proper for summary judgment.
Moreover, the facts do not support this conclusion. LRH's January 30, 2001 letter
expressly recognizes the possibility of individual settlement for any one of the clients or
for the assignment of one or more of the clients' interests. Mr. Zimmerman further
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indicated in his deposition that State Farm would have entertained individual settlement
with any individual clients. (R. 1466.) See Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d 1292 (noting "it takes
only one sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the
controversy and create an issue of fact." (quotations and citation omitted)).
In addition, the joint-representation agreements of December 6, 1984, September
1995, and December 7, 2001 all indicate that Slusher had at least a 1/3 interest in the
outcome of the litigation. (R. 338-41; 375-78.) Although Slusher's name was not on the
caption, to the extent Slusher wanted to settle all or a portion of his interest with State
Farm, and to the extent State Farm wanted to reduce its contingent liability to Slusher of
approximately $50,000,000 in this manner, certainly the many capable lawyers involved
in that case could have come to an agreement to adequately protect and serve both State
Farm's and the Clients' interests.
These facts demonstrate that there was a very real possibility that such a
settlement would have occurred but for C&J's malpractice.

This fulfills Slusher's

For example, Slusher, if properly advised and represented by LRH, could
have approached State Farm and advised it that Mrs. Campbell and the Ospitals would
not agree to the withdrawal of the opinion, which appeared to be a condition of State
Farm to pay the full $150,000,000, but that they had assigned to him one-third of the
judgment to separately negotiate with State Farm. Slusher would have then had that
opportunity to separately negotiate with State Farm regarding its contingent liability to
him of $50,000,000- $65,000,000, including interest. In a multi-billion dollar asset
insurance company such as State Farm, management was and is always primarily and
materially concerned with earnings and reporting a positive bottom line to its equity
holders. (R. 1474.) Regardless of its size, the management of any company would
rationally and reasonably be interested in reducing and negotiating down a contingent
liability of $50,000,000- $65,000,000, and it would be a breach of their fiduciary duty to
the company and the equity holders not to pursue such negotiations.
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burden on summary judgment. By ruling that the absence of S lusher's name on the
caption defeated any such settlement opportunity as a matter of law, the trial court
improperly weighed the evidence and usurped the role of the jury.
3.

The Vacatur Condition does not defeat causation.

The final argument relied upon by the trial court in granting summary judgment is
that the vacatur condition of State Farm's settlement offer could not be satisfied because
the Utah Supreme Court, as a matter of law, would not have vacated its 2001 State Farm
decision. (R. 991-92.) Whether or not the Utah Supreme Court would have, in fact,
vacated the decision pursuant to a stipulated motion is a difficult question that was never
actually briefed or presented to this Court. In addition there appears to be no published
Utah authority addressing this subject, although Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure provides the mechanism for such a procedure. Nonetheless, it is not necessary
for the Court to decide this question here for at least three reasons.
First, Slusher has asserted that C&J's malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty
deprived him of an opportunity to settle his interest in the State Farm case. As

Further, Mr. Zimmerman testified that State Farm had handicapped the likelihood
of the United States Supreme Court granting certiorari to no more than one out of four
chances. (R. 981-82.) That likely result was factored into their settlement offer of
$150,000,000, a discount from the total judgment of approximately $200,000,000 with
interest. This establishes that State Farm prepared and evaluated settlement opportunities
by following a defined mathematical formula and by employing a formal cost-benefit
analysis. From this, it is reasonably inferable that State Farm management would have
entertained settlement negotiations with Slusher to reduce its contingent liability.
Assuming a modest settlement of $15,000,000, State Farm would have reduced its
contingent liability by a minimum of $35,000,000. No rational and responsible manager
of a public company would fail to seriously negotiate such a result. (R. 1474.)
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acknowledged by C&J in the January 30, 2001 letter, such a settlement, had it been
explored by C&J in the context of an actual offer, could have taken the form of an
assignment or sale of Slusher's interest to a litigation financing company for a discounted
rate. (R. 1466.) As such, Slusher could have sold his 1/3 interest in the $150,000,000
judgment prior to the vacatur question becoming an actual issue.
Second, part of Slusher's malpractice claim stems from C&J's failure to further
explore settlement with State Farm, including the vacatur condition of its November 14,
2001 offer. Had C&J fulfilled its professional and fiduciary duties and discussed this
term with State Farm, it would have learned that State Farm only sought vacatur to
prevent the collateral estoppel effects of the judgment and that State Farm was not
seeking a "gag order" from the Clients.14 (R. 539-40.) C&J may also have been able to
negotiate an exception to the vacatur condition in exchange for accepting less money.
C&J could have then discussed this condition with the Clients with the proper
understanding, informing them, for example, that the decision was already published and
would not simply vanish and, in addition, that a reversal of the decision by the Utah
The Client's deposition testimonies indicate that C&J did not properly inform
them that, even in the event of vacatur, the decision would remain published and that
State Farm did not seek a "gag order." (R. 539-40.) For example, Mrs. Campbell testified
that she "didn't know how much could be erased and how much could not" by a vacatur
motion and that State Farm would not be "exposed" if there were a vacatur, (R. 653.)
Mrs. Ospital testified that she understood from LRH "that there would be no publicity
about it. That in a sense—in essence, it just had not happened." (R. 655.) Slusher
testified "it was like the decision wasn't going to exist, I think [LRH] said." (R.662.)
LRH even acknowledged that he did not clarify State Farm's intent regarding the vacatur
condition, stating: "There were questions asked about [vacating the opinion], 'Well does
that mean then, that State Farm would be paying us to keep our mouth shut?' I said, 'Yes,
that's exactly what it is.'" (R.668.) As Zimmerman's deposition testimony shows, LRH
was incorrect as State Farm was not seeking a "gag order" or confidentiality provisions.
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Supreme Court on rehearing or by the U.S. Supreme Court on certiorari would have had
much the same effect as a vacation. Such a discussion, among all the Clients and Barrett,
would have provided Mrs. Campbell and the Ospitals with the information to make an
informed decision regarding the offer, in which case they may have chosen to accept.
Third, whether or not this Court would have vacated the 2001 State Farm decision
is not relevant to causation. By the time the Court would have considered the vacatur
question upon joint motion from the State Farm and the Clients, the Settlement Offer
would have already been accepted. Under State Farm's November 14, 2001 Settlement
Offer, State Farm was to escrow the $150,000,000 payable upon vacation of the opinion
following the joint motion to vacate. What would have happened if the Settlement Offer
was accepted, but this Court would not vacate is uncertain. This is something that C&J,
consistent with its professional and fiduciary duties to its clients, should have explored
and discussed with its Clients prior to rejecting the offer. Surely C&J could have
negotiated to secure some guaranteed money for one or all of the Clients in exchange for
agreeing to join in the motion to vacate. Mr. Zimmerman indicated State Farm was
willing to negotiate further (r. 540-42), and State Farm even invited such negotiations
through its Settlement Offer Letter, wherein State Farm stated it wanted to settle "before
the Utah Supreme Court rules on State Farm's soon to be filed petition for rehearing," a
week or two hence, not by noon of November 16, 2001 or not all. (R. 343.) (Emphasis
added.) The problem is, C&J did not even try. Nevertheless, it is clear that whether or
not this Court would have vacated the opinion might be relevant in the jury's
determination as to the amount damages, but not to causation. See, e.g., Judd v. Drezga,
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2004 UT 91,134, 103 P.3d 135 (observing, like causation, "damages are a question of
fact, and that questions of fact are distinctly within the jury's province").
However, if the Court determines it must consider whether it would have granted
vacatur, it must be emphasized that the vacatur condition was offered by Mr.
Zimmerman, who was a former Chief Justice of the Utah Supreme Court. It seems
intuitive that if there was no chance for vacatur, former Chief Justice Zimmerman, who
remained on the Court until 2000, would not have made this offer on behalf of his client;
it was not his practice to "make idle suggestions." (R. 517; 974.) Given this, the fact that
Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides the mechanism for vacatur,
the large settlement offer, and Utah's public policy favoring settlement,15 it is reasonable
to conclude that this Court may have vacated its 2001 State Farm decision, had it come
before the Court on joint motion of all parties and been properly briefed.
ATTORNEY FEE DISPUTE
When reviewing an unjust enrichment award, this Court reviews the trial court's
legal conclusions for "correctness" and upholds a lower court's findings of fact unless
"the evidence supporting them is so lacking that we must conclude the finding is 'clearly
erroneous."5 DesertMirah, Inc. v.B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83,19, 12 P.3d 580.
Furthermore, the Court "afford[s] broad discretion to the trial court in its application of
unjust enrichment law to the facts." Id. (quotations and citation omitted).
Here, the trial court clearly erred in awarding Barrett only $25,000 in attorney fees

15

See Slusher v. Ospital, 111 P.2d 437, 441 (Utah 1989). ("The public policy is to
encourage settlements.")
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for at least two reasons. First, the trial court failed to ascribe a dollar figure to any of its
findings or in any way establish that $25,000, as opposed to some other amount, flows
logically from its findings. Second, the trial court erred as a matter of law by using a
measure to determine Barrett's equitable compensation that incorrectly ignored Barrett's
and C&J's historical arrangement and stated intent—appearing in the October 10, 1990
Agreement between LRH and Barrett—to "equitably" share the fees based the "present
posture of the case" and their "respective involvements" on a 1/3-2/3 basis in favor of
C&J rather than 50-50.16 (R. 335.)
I.

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE $25,000 AWARD
FLOWS LOGICALLY FROM THE EVIDENCE.
Although a trial court is given broad discretion is fashioning equitable awards, it is

fundamental that:
[Findings of fact "must show that the court's judgment or
decree follows logically from, and is supported by, the
evidence. The findings should be sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which
the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."

It is unclear here exactly what the standard of review should be because the trial
court did not indicate what standard it was using in shaping the equitable award, instead
stating "whether judged by the standard or unjust enrichment, actual value of the services
rendered, or by any other reasonable standard . .. ." (R. 2099.) This, in turn, makes
briefing this issue extremely difficult and serves as yet another reversible error in the trial
court's decision as to attorney fees. Nevertheless, Barrett will attempt to brief this issue
by employing the unjust enrichment standard, enumerated above, establishing a
correctness standard for legal conclusions, a clear error standard for fact findings, and an
abuse of discretion standard for applying laws to the facts. See also Parduhn v. Bennett,
2005 UT 22,^23-25, 112 P.3d 495 (designating a clearly erroneous standard for fact
review and correctness standard for review of legal conclusions in an equitable
distribution proceeding); RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60,Tf35, 96 P.3d 935 (applying
these standards to all cases in equity).
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Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22,^24, 112 P.3d 495 (citations omitted).
In the present case, the ultimate conclusion that Barrett is challenging is the trial
court's award of $25,000. Listed in Paragraph 49 (including subparagraphs a-j) of this
Brief are all the facts the trial court relied upon in arriving at this award, fulfilling
Barrett's marshaling burden. Noticeably, the trial court did not ascribe a dollar value to
any of these findings. Rather, the trial court indicated only
[i]n light of the evidence adduced, and weighing of all of the
equities and other relevant considerations, the Court
determines that $25,000.00 represents a fair, reasonable and
equitable amount fully compensating Barrett for all of the
professional services which he rendered in connection with
the Campbell case, as well as for the value which he brought
and/or added to the case.
(R. 2102.) Of further note is the fact that this amount does not reflect either the amount
prayed for by Barrett in his Memorandum of Support of Attorney Fees: Equity Phase of
the Proceedings, which was $796,348, (r. 1756-1810) or C&J's Memorandum in
Opposition, which set the mark at $21,350. (R. 1968-2035.)
Even if the trial court followed C&J's admittedly closer figure, this still does not
explain how the trial court arrived at an award that was $3,650 higher than C&J's. Did
the trial court rely on Barrett's evidence to come up with the difference? If so, which
evidence? It is not explained and, thus, impossible to tell.
Without any indication as to what each subsidiary finding is worth it is likewise
impossible for Barrett to properly challenge these findings. For example, Barrett asserts
that the trial court erred in concluding in Paragraph 13 of its Findings and Conclusions
that C&J, alone, bore the risk of "losing [advanced] costs should the case not have
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resulted in a favorable verdict for the plaintiffs." (R. 2100; lf49(e), above.) This is
inaccurate because under Paragraph 4 of the 1984 joint-representation agreement, in the
event there was no recovery, the Clients were to bear the risk of loss for costs in same
proportion as their recovery (that is 45% each to Slusher and the Ospitals, and 10% to
Mr. Campbell); C&J, in fact, bore no risk. (R. 340.) And, because costs were not
addressed in the December 7, 2001 agreement, under paragraph 4 of that 2001 agreement,
the original 1984 distribution and risk of loss remained in effect. (R. 376.)
The problem is, the way in which the trial court's decision is rendered, there is no
way for Barrett or this Court to determine the effect this error has on the trial court's
ultimate conclusion that Barrett is only entitled to $25,000, or less than 0.5% of the feeaward. This constitutes clear error, as the trial court failed to show its judgment flows
logically from the evidence. It should be reversed and remanded for the proper findings.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY USING THE WRONG MEASURE IN
EQUITY AND SPECIFICALLY BY IGNORING THE PARTIES5
INTENDED EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION AS INDICATED BY THE
OCTOBER 1990 AGREEMENT.
The trial court also erred by using an incorrect equitable standard or legal measure

and by completely ignoring C&J's and Barrett's agreed upon and stated intent—
appearing in the October 10, 1990 Agreement between LRH and Barrett—to "equitably"
share the fees based upon "the present posture of the case" and their "respective
involvements" on a 1/3-2/3 basis in favor of C&J rather than 50-50.
The trial court's choice of a which equitable measure to use is a legal conclusion.
Moreover, the trial court may rely on an invalidated or unenforceable contract to
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determine the parties' intended equitable division. In Parduhn, for example, this Court
upheld the trial court's reliance on the terms of an invalidated agreement in determining
the parties' intended distribution in an equitable proceeding. 2005 UT 22 at f 33. First, the
Court concluded that the trial court reliance on the contract was "appropriately
characterized as [a] legal challenge[]" to be reviewed as a question of law. Id.; cf. Alpha
Partners, Inc. v. Transamerica Inv. Mgmt., LLC, 2006 UT App 331,^14,153 P.3d 714
("'Interpretation of the terms of a contract is a question of law." (quotations and citation
omitted)). The Parduhn Court then stated:
We see no reason why a contract, valid or invalid, cannot act
as an indicator of intent in an equitable distribution
proceeding. Even if a written agreement is invalid for the
purposes of enforcement, it may still be considered as
evidence of the intent behind the agreement See Bennett
Leasing Co. v. Ellison, 15 Utah 2d 72, 387 P.2d 246, 274
(1963) (looking to an invalid contract to determine the rental
value of a car). . . . Moreover, contrary to Parduhn's assertion,
doing so is not the same as enforcing the agreement.
Parduhn, 2005 UT 22 at^34.
In the present case, the trial court erred by ignoring the parties' intended method
of equitable distribution, which was reflected in the October 10, 1990 agreement. As
indicated, in the October 1990 agreement, prepared by LRH, C&J and Barrett modified
the 50-50 split under the original 1984 agreement as follows:
This will confirm our agreement and understanding
concerning the split of the attorneys fees relating to this
action. Given the present posture of the case and our
respective involvements, we agreed that an equitable split
of the attorneys fees would be an apportionment of 2/3 of
the fee to Christensen, Jensen & Powell, and 1/3 to your
office. You would continue to render some assistance in the
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case and I would continue to be lead counsel.
(R. 335.) (Emphasis added.) Similar to Parduhn, this agreement clearly reflects Barrett's
and C&J's intent regarding how their fees should be equitably divided given their
respective involvements in the case both at the time and going forward. Barrett gave up a
portion of his share of the fee as additional consideration to C&J for its continuing to
provide the direction and much larger litigation efforts.
Contrary to this clear indication of intent, the trial court appears to have followed
C&J's suggestion to give Barrett his fees "proportionate to his effort and contribution to
the work necessary to pursue the State Farm claim." (R. 2084.) However, as the October
1990 agreement makes clear, the parties never intended the fees to be divided on such a
basis. Rather, the agreed-upon "equitable" arrangement between the parties required
Barrett to render "some assistance" in exchange for reduced fees. (R 335.)
The jury found that this agreement was enforceable, but that by some measure
Barrett was not fulfilling his obligations thereunder. (R. 2098-99.) This calls for some
further equitable adjustment in his compensation. This is not dissimilar than the same
type of adjustment the parties did themselves in 1990 when they too noted that C&J was
doing more than anticipated between the parties. What is clearly called for is a measure
in equity of how much difference there was between Barrett's proportionate efforts as
anticipated in October 1990 compared to his proportionate efforts after that date. Since
the parties made a significant adjustment then for the very same reasons (disproportionate
efforts)—Barrett's share then moving from one half to one third—a similar adjustment is
called for now.
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Here, the trial court without any legal justification switched the method of
measurement and, in doing so, failed to use the correct legal measure in applying
equitable principles. Instead, it likely treated Barrett as though he was simply providing
services without a contract on an hourly basis to be paid fully and completely by simply
multiplying hours times legal billing rate, although the trial court's order is still unclear
how it arrived at $25,000. That was not ever the basis for compensation and work
division between the parties. For this reason, the trial court's decision should be
reversed; incorrect legal principles were used.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
C&J on Slusher's and Barrett's malpractice claims and its equitable award to Barrett on
the attorney-fee claims must be reversed.
DATED this o\ *> day of April 2007.
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON

E. Barney Gesas
Charles R. Brown
Walter A. Romney
BARRETT & DAINES
N. George Daines
Attorneys for Appellants
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ROBERT SLUSHER

CASE NO.

030916399

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for a hearing on November 21, 2005, in
connection with the counterdefendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the Court took this Motion under advisement to further consider the parties' written
submissions, the relevant legal authority and counsel's oral argument. Having now had an
opportunity to become fully informed about the issues presented in the Motion for Summary
Judgment, the Court rules as stated herein.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
At the outset, the Court notes that this case stems from the Campbell v. State Farm case.
Because the State Farm case resulted in protracted litigation and an extensive appellate history,
the Court will not detail the facts or procedural background of this underlying case. Given the
issues raised in the counterdefendants' Motion, the Court will instead focus on the events
surrounding Mr. Zimmerman's November 14, 2001, settlement letter, addressed to Mr.

>eputy Clei
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Humpherys (and received by Mr. Humpherys on November 16, 2001).
In his letter, Mr. Zimmerman, who was acting as counsel for State Farm, proposed a
settlement conditioned upon two events: (1) The plaintiffs (Campbells) joining State Farm in
requesting that the Supreme Court vacate its opinion and decision issued on October 19,2001,
and (2) the Utah Supreme Court actually vacating this opinion and decision. This settlement
proposal must be considered against the backdrop of the December 7,2001, Agreement between
the Campbells, the Ospitals and Mr. Slusher, which provided that there could be no settlement
against State Farm without the "united approval" of all three parties.
While plead under a variety of claims, the Court determines that all of the loss theories
advanced by W. Scott Barrett and Mr. Slusher ("counterclaimants") in their Counterclaim are
based on the loss of the settlement offer. The counterdefendants' Motion focuses strictly on the
causation element of each of these counterclaims under the "but for" standard for causation
articulated in Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah App. 1996). In light of
this standard, there are three primary issues before this Court are: (1) Whether the Campbells and
the Ospitals, if advised differently, would have accepted State Farm's offer on November 16,
2001; (2) Whether Mr. Slusher, if advised differently, could have arranged for a separate
settlement with State Farm and (3) Whether the Utah Supreme Court would or would not have
vacated its opinion in the State Farm case. The Court further notes that according to the
Kilpatrick decision, "causation or the connection between fault and damages in legal malpractice
actions 'cannot properly be based on speculation or conjecture.'" IcL at 1291 (citations omitted).
With respect to the first issue, the counterclaimants initially focused on whether the
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Campbells and the Ospitals would have accepted State Farm's offer if they had known that the
Utah Supreme Court opinion was public and would not disappear in the event of vacutur.
However, during oral argument, counsel for the counterclaimants, Mr. Gesas, agreed that while
the Campbells and the Ospitals may not have accepted State Farm's offer, the real issue is
whether a reasonable person would have accepted if they had been properly advised that the State
Farm opinion would remain public. Mr. Gesas argued that there are factual disputes on what a
reasonable person would have done.
First, the Court disagrees that the reasonable person standard applies under these
circumstances. To the contrary, the Court concludes that the proper focus is on what the
Campbells and Ospitals would have done if Mr. Humpherys had advised them differently. In this
regard, the overwhelming evidence is that the Campbells and the Ospitals, even with the clarity
of hindsight, would unequivocally not have given their consent to State Farm's settlement offer.
In fact, the counterdefendants cited to testimony and statements made by the Campbells and
Ospitals indicating their perception that the offer was "offensive" and that State Farm was trying
to pay them to "keep their mouths shut." As counsel point out, these parties were less concerned
about the money which they could ultimately recover from State Farm, then about "making
things better for the little guy" and exposing State Farm's misconduct. This testimony is
incompatible with the counterclaimants' position that "but for" Mr. Humphrey's failure to
properly advise the Campbells and Ospitals, they would have accepted State Farm's offer.
However, the inquiry regarding the counterclaimants' ability to establish the causation
element does not end there. Specifically, during oral argument, Mr. Gesas asserted that "but for"
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Mr. Humphrey's failure to properly advise Mr. Slusher, he could have potentially reached a
separate and independent settlement with State Farm. According to Mr. Gesas, Mr. Humpherys
should have recognized that Mr. Slusher's interest were no longer aligned with the Campbells
and the Ospitals. He suggests that if Mr. Humpherys had advised Mr. Slusher to seek
independent counsel, Mr. Slusher could have explored the possibility of seeking a settlement
with State Farm that was separate from the remaining parties. Mr. Gesas concluded that Mr.
Humpherys instead subordinated Mr. Slusher's interests to the Campbells and Ospitals, thereby
precluding him from even approaching State Farm about this possibility.
After carefully considering Mr. Gesas' position, it is important to emphasize that since
Mr. Slusher was not a party to the State Farm case, an independent settlement with Mr. Slusher
would have held no cognizable advantage or gain for State Farm. In addition, even if State Farm
were to entertain such an offer, it does not appear that a separate settlement would have been
permissible under the parties' December 7,2001, Agreement, which required unanimous consent
to any settlement. Overall, the Court is satisfied that this portion of the counterclaimants'
causation argument is improperly based on speculation and conjecture.
Next, the Court considers the second component of the settlement offer, the vacatur of the
Utah Supreme Court decision. At the outset, the Court concludes that the question of whether
vacatur would have been granted is a legal question which must be resolved by this Court.
Therefore, the opinions provided by the counterclaimants' experts are neither helpful, nor
appropriate in this context.
That brings the Court to the extensive legal authority on the issue of vacatur. After
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carefully reviewing the cases relied on by both sides, the Court determines that the majority
position is that only under extraordinary circumstances will vacatur be granted (particularly
where the vacatur is sought in connection with settlement). In fact, it appears that vacatur is most
often granted in cases which become moot on their own and not through the actions of the
parties. Otherwise, as the counterdefendants correctly emphasize, precedent and the attendant
interests of outside parties could be wiped out. As a result, the presumption is that only under
extraordinary circumstances will the vacatur of a court's decision be justified. U.S. Bancorp
Mortgage Co. V. Bonner Mall. 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
In this case, the likelihood of vacatur is even more remote. As the counterdefendants
point out, the 80-page opinion issued by the Utah Supreme Court was significant not only to the
parties in State Farm, but also to outside parties whose interests were also affected. In fact, the
opinion, which was couched in extremely strong language, addressed actions and issues beyond
the parties of the State Farm lawsuit. Clearly, the Utah Supreme Court intended to send a
message and create seminal precedence by issuing the extensive State Farm opinion. Given the
importance of the State Farm decision and the lack of exceptional circumstances to justify the
vacatur of this decision, the Court determines as a matter of law that the Utah Supreme Court
would not have vacated its decision.
Based on the foregoing, the Court determines that even if Mr. Humpherys had advised the
Campbells and Ospitals or Mr. Slusher differently, the counterclaimants cannot establish the
standard of causation which applies to their counterclaims. Accordingly, the Court grants the
counterdefendants5 Motion for Summary Judgment. Counsel for the counterdefendants is to
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prepare an Order consistent with but not limited to this Memorandum Decision,
Dated this y day of January, 2006.

"LAKfJ
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C, flea
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
RECONSIDER AND MOTION TO
ALTER OR AMEND

Plaintiffs,
No. 030916399
vs.

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

BARRETT & DAINES; W. SCOTT BARRETT,
fka BARRETT & BRADY,
Defendants.

W. SCOTT BARRETT and ROBERT
SLUSHER,
Counterclaimants,
vs.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN and L. RICH
HUMPHERYS,
Counterdefendants.
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The Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration or Alternatively to Alter or Amend the Summary
Judgment, having been fully briefed by all parties, came before the Court for consideration without hearing, the Court having determined that oral argument would not materially assist the Court in consideration of the motion.
The Court is persuaded that its previous decision was carefully considered and correct, and that
the materials submitted in support of the motion to reconsider are not persuasive. The Court's reliance
on the December 7, 2001 agreement was correct, even though that agreement was signed after the State
Farm settlement offer was rejected, because it was undisputed that the December 7, 2001 agreement
"formally memorialized" a 1995 agreement "that there would be no settlement with State Farm without
the unanimous approval of the Campbells, Slusher and Ospitals." The Court did not err in relying on
that agreement, because it merely documented a previously existing agreement.
The Court is also persuaded that its previous observation, that separate settlement "would have
held no cognizable advantage or gain for State Farm," was correct. The question what State Farm would
actually have considered acceptable by way of settlement, beyond what it actually offered to do, remains
a subject of speculation. Without the cooperation of the Campbells and Ospitals, Slusher could not satisfy the vacatur condition imposed by State Farm, and he could not deliver dismissal of the case. To
then suggest that State Farm might have attempted to cut its potential losses by settling separately with
Slusher is even more speculative than the proposition that a global settlement could have been achieved,
and thus fails to satisfy the standard of causation which applies to their counterclaims.
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For the reasons stated herein, in plaintiffs' opposing memorandum, and in the Court's Minute
Entry dated July 18, 2006, Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration or Alternatively to Alter or Amend
the Summary Judgment is DENIED.
DATED this _[£_ day of Scpcifcr, 2006.
BY TH£ COURT:

MOfHY R.'HANSON, |UDGE
HIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
Approved as to Form:
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C, fka
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C;
L. RICH HUMPHERYS, individually,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 030916399
Judge Timothy R. Hanson

vs.
BARRETT & DAINES; W. SCOTT
BARRETT, fka BARRETT & BRADY;
ROBERT SLUSHER,
Defendants/Counterclaimants.

The Court having duly considered the evidence, the written and oral arguments of the
parties, having issued its Memorandum Decision and being fully advised, hereby issues the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This matter came before the Court as a result of a declaratory judgment action

filed by plaintiff and counterclaim defendant, Christensen & Jensen, P.C. ("C&J") against
Barrett and Daines fka Barrett and Brady seeking determination as to a dispute with defendant

over attorneys' fees following the conclusion of Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance,
civil no. 890905231.
2.

C&J claimed that there was a bona fide dispute between C&J and Barrett &

Daines over attorneys' fees and asked for a judicial resolution of the dispute.
3.

Barrett and Daines filed an Answer and Counterclaim (in which W. Scott Barrett

and Robert Slusher joined) asserting that "W. Scott Barrett, in his individual capacity as
attorney, is the sole successor to the law firm of Barrett & Brady and that Barrett and Daines had
no interest in the subject matter of the action." (The Counterclaim added L. Rich Humpherys as
a counter defendant and raised various tort and other claims besides the fee dispute. Those other
claims were ultimately dismissed by this Court by way of summary judgment). The fee dispute,
which is the subject of these findings and conclusions has Christensen & Jensen, P.C. and W.
Scott Barrett ("Barrett") as the only parties.
4.

Barrett requested trial by jury. Ultimately, pursuant to the parties' agreement, the

below listed issues were to be tried before a jury, with the Court to decide the remaining issues if
the jury's verdict went against Barrett. The trial took place on April 4, 5, 6 and 10, 2006 with
the following Special Verdict being submitted to the jury:
a.

Did Christensen & Jensen and Scott Barrett enter into a valid

contract to divide attorney fees in the Campbell v. State Farm case one-third
(1/3) to Mr. Barrett and two-thirds (2/3) to Christensen & Jensen?
b.

Did the Scott Barrett perform his obligations under the contract?
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c.

Did Christensen & Jensen unreasonably prevent Mr. Barrett

from performing his obligations under the contract?
5.

On April 10, 2006, the jury returned its Special Verdict answering yes to the first

question and no to the remaining questions. The jury was polled by the Court and it was
determined that the verdict on all three questions was unanimous.
6.

Based on the jury's verdict, Barrett was precluded from recovering under his

contractual theories. Accordingly, it then fell to the Court to decide the amount of fees to which
Barrett was entitled based on equitable principles.
7.

Following the jury verdict, the parties submitted memoranda and other pleadings

and evidence regarding the equity issues. A hearing was held before the Court on June 5, 2006
to allow the parties to present oral arguments and to respond to questions from the Court.
8.

The Court heard all of the evidence that was presented to the jury and finds that

the jury's findings were well-supported by the evidence.
9.

The Court further finds that whether judged by the standard of unjust enrichment,

actual value of services rendered, or by any other reasonable standard, Barrett's contribution to
the prosecution of the Campbell v. State Farm case was minimal.
10.

Of the almost 100 depositions taken in the Campbell case, including the eleven

(11) depositions taken of the Campbells, Slusher, and the Ospitals, Barrett only attended two.
Even in those, he had no active participation. C&J attended and actively participated in all of the
depositions.
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11.

Of the many hundreds of pages of pleadings filed in the Campbell case, Barrett

only prepared one pleading, i.e. one motion to compel (consisting of two (2) pages) with a
supporting memorandum of three (3) pages.
12.

Barrett did not appear as counsel at any of the many hours and days of pre-trial or

post-trial hearings, nor did he participate as counsel during either of the bifurcated trials which
lasted approximately ten (10) weeks.
13.

More than $500,000.00 of out-of-pocket expenses were advanced as part of the

prosecution of the plaintiffs' claims in the Campbell case. Although Barrett was aware of the
need to advance such costs and that the Campbells did not have the money to pay them, he
refused C&J's requests that he share equitable in the costs advanced.

(Barrett steadfastly

maintained that position even though his own testimony established that he had access to the
necessary financial resources). Consequently, the costs advanced, together with the potential
risk of losing such costs should the case not have resulted in a favorable verdict for the plaintiffs,
had to be borne by C&J.
14.

The attorneys at C&J were also required to spend large amounts of time doing the

work that Barrett failed to do.
15.

Trial examination of Scott Barrett and other evidence revealed that he lacked an

understanding of fundamental matters involved in the Campbell v. State Farm case, such as the
distinction between first and third party bad faith claims, the names of key trial witnesses or the
content of important exhibits and pleadings.
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16.

Barrett played no role in any of the four appeals which the successful prosecution

of the Campbell case required.
17.

His intermittent role as a spectator at some of the hearings and during parts of the

trials did not contribute to the advancement of the case in any material way.
18.

Very early on (April 3, 1987), the trial court in the Campbell case ruled that

Robert Slusher (as well as the Ospitals) had no bad faith claims against State Farm and those
claims were dismissed with prejudice. That ruling was never challenged by Slusher, Barrett or
anyone else.
19.

Slusher's interest in the Campbell case was limited to a contractual right to share

in the proceeds of the Campbell's claims against State Farm. Ultimately, Slusher realized almost
$3,000,000.00 from such contractual rights. This was in addition to Slusher's receiving the full
amount (including interest) of the personal injury judgment rendered in his favor against Curtis
Campbell in the Logan case.
20.

Slusher's ability to receive any amount from the Campbell v. State Farm case was

entirely dependent on the success of the claims of Inez and Curtis Campbell. The ultimate
success of the Campbell's claims against State Farm was the result of the financial resources and
professional services provided by C&J (with assistance from Lawrence Tribe and his associates).
Slusher was obligated to pay C&J the contingency fee attributable to the portion of the
Campbell's recovery realized by Slusher, regardless of whether Barrett encouraged him to or
not. Slusher was contractually obligated to cooperate with the Campbells and their counsel.
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21.

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, Barrett is not entitled to a

"finder's fee" or some other attorney's fee enhancement for allegedly encouraging Slusher not to
drop out of the group. Under the Court's award, Barrett is being compensated for all of the time
which he spent in dealing with Slusher on that matter, as well as all others.
22.

In light of the evidence adduced, and weighing all of the equities and other

relevant considerations, the Court determines that $25,000.00 represents a fair, reasonable and
equitable amount fully compensating Barrett for all of the professional services which he
rendered in connection with the Campbell case, as well as for the value which he brought and/or
added to the case.
23.

By Barrett's own testimony, he could not simply "hand off Robert Slusher to

C&J for a referral fee, but was required to assume joint-responsibility with C&J in the
representation of the Campbells, Ospitals and Slusher. Barrett did not fulfill his obligation to
assume such joint responsibility.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The terms of an attorney-client relationship is governed by both the ethical rules

governing attorney conduct and contract law. (PADD v. Graystone, 789 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah App.
1990).
2.

As part of Jury Instruction No. 37 the parties agreed that Utah law precludes a

lawyer, under a joint-responsibility arrangement with another lawyer, from simply "handing off
a client to the other lawyer in exchange for a referral fee. Because of such stipulation (as well as
applicable law) this legal principal is binding in this case.
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3.

The Utah Supreme Court has granted trial court's broad discretion in their

application of the law of unjust enrichment to the facts of a specific case. {Desert Miriah, Inc. v.
B&L Auto, Inc., et al, 12 P.3d 580 (Utah 2000).
DATED this) y

day of October, 2006.
BY TME'

APPROVED AS TO FORM

E. Barney Gesas
Clyde Snow Sessions &fSwenson
One Utah Center, Surfe 1300
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City,Utah 84111-2516
Attorneys for Defendants / Counterclaimants
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, PC, fka
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL,
P C ; L. RICH HUMPHERYS,
individually,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CASE NO.

030916399

Fitip sss?MCT mum

Plaintiffs/Counterclaim
Defendants,

Third Judicial District

JUL ! r: 2006

vs.

SOONTY

BARRETT & DAINES; W. SCOTT
BARRETT, fka BARRETT & BRADY;
ROBERT SLUSHER
Defendants.

:

Counsel and the parties last appeared before this Court on June 5,
2006, to argue their respective positions regarding the controversy
surrounding the distribution of fees growing out of the Campbell v. State
Farm case.

At that time, the Court heard argument of counsel and took

the matter under advisement to further review the parties' written
submissions in light of their oral arguments.

The Court has undertaken

those activities and being fully advised, enters the following Memorandum
Decision.
This matter was first before the Court as a result of a declaratory
action

filed

by

the

plaintiff

Christensen

&

Jensen

seeking

a

determination as to attorney's fees following the conclusion of a bad
faith lawsuit against State Farm Insurance Company entitled Campbell v.
State Farm.
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Christensen & Jensen asserted that co-counsel W. Scott Barrett
(hereinafter "Barrett") was not entitled to a percentage of the fees as
was originally agreed between Christensen & Jensen and Barrett, in that
Barrett had not performed his share of the work to prosecute the decadeslong Campbell case, and sought a determination of the fees to which
Barrett was entitled, based upon his contribution to the work required
to prosecute the case.

Christensen & Jensen has never during these

proceedings sought to withhold all fees from Barrett, but rather argues
that his share of the fees should be proportionate to his effort and
contribution to the work necessary to pursue the State Farm claim.
Barrett originally asserted that he was entitled to his percentage share
without regard to the number of hours or the effort that he had
contributed to the Campbell case.
Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the matter of enforceability of
the written agreement between Christensen & Jensen and Barrett for the
distribution of fees and other related matters was put to a jury after
a multi-day trial. The jury found that Barrett did not perform his share
of the work under the written agreement, and that Christensen & Jensen
did nothing to prohibit Barrett from performing the required attorney's
services in the Campbell case had he chose to do so. In other words, the
jury found that Barrett breached the agreement to share fees.
The parties had initially agreed that if the jury found that Barrett
was not entitled to a percentage of fees under the agreement, the Court

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN
V. BARRETT & DAINES

PAGE 3

MEMORANDUM DECISION

would then consider what amount of fees to which Barrett was entitled
based upon equitable principles.
Following the jury verdict, the parties submitted Memoranda and
other pleadings regarding the equity issues.
above, was held on June 5, 2006.

A hearing, as indicated

Since that date, also as indicated

above, the Court has had an opportunity to review the oral arguments, the
written submissions of the parties, review the case authorities cited,
consider the equities of this case, and being fully advised, determines
that the value contributed to the attorney fee effort in the

Campbell

case by Barrett is the sum of $25,000. The Court is satisfied that that
sum represents a fair, reasonable and equitable figure which would
reflect the value brought to the case by Barrett.
The Court makes this determination based upon the value of Barrett's
services in prosecuting the case. By any standard, whether it be unjust
enrichment or actual value of services rendered (hours of attorney's
work), Barrett's contribution was minimal.

The case spanned 21 years.

Barrett did little more than get his client, Mr. Robert Slusher, to
forego potential (not guaranteed as Barrett suggests) collection of the
personal injury Judgment for which Slusher was later handsomely rewarded,
prepare a modest discovery request, attend some hearings, and sit at
trial part of the time.
Barrett's claim that he kept Mr. Slusher in the group when Slusher
became dissatisfied with Christensen & Jensen means little. The case was
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not and could not be prosecuted against State Farm by Mr. Slusher. His
interest was only to receive a percentage of the ultimate recovery, and
the dropping out of the group may very well have constituted a breach of
Mr. Slusher's agreement, jeopardizing his potential for recovery once the
case was resolved. Barrett's suggestion that Christensen & Jensen would
not have participated in any contingency fee which may have related to
Mr.

Slusher's

portion

of

the

ultimate

award

is

without

merit.

Christensen & Jensen did the work which brought about the recovery, and
they would have an attorney's fee claim against Mr. Slusher's portion of
the recovery.
The work in prosecuting the

Campbell v. State Farm case was

extraordinary in amount and scope.

The case was twice brought in the

District Court.

The matter proceeded to the Utah Supreme Court.

It

thereafter was accepted, and a decision rendered by the United States
Supreme Court, remanding the matter back to the Utah Supreme Court, and
ultimately back to the trial court.

The great majority of all the work

that was done to bring that case to a conclusion was accomplished by the
law firm of Christensen & Jensen.
Further, the Court notes that on the issue of costs advanced, Mr.
Barrett contributed nothing of any substance towards the costs advanced
in the Campbell case.

The Court would assume that if Mr. Barrett

expected one-third of the fees, he should have been willing to advance
one-third of the substantial costs that were incurred in this case;
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All those costs advanced, together with the

potential risk of losing those costs advanced should the case not have
resulted in a favorable verdict for the plaintiffs, would have been borne
by Christensen & Jensen, not Barrett. In the overall scheme of equities,
that factor must be considered, as well.
Considering the foregoing and evaluating the trial testimony as to
the benefit conferred upon the case and/or Christensen & Jensen by
Barrett, the Court is satisfied that an award of $25,000 is fair,
equitable and reasonable under all of the circumstances presented.
The Court has not attempted to address all the claims and defenses
offered by either side in this dispute, but finds that the argument and
observations

in

Christensen

&

Jensen's

brief

most

persuasive.

Christensen & Jensen is to prepare comprehensive Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, all as indicated herein.

The final

papers should be submitted in accordance with the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Any Objections shall be briefed in accordance with Rule 7 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Additionally, there are two items that require the Court's comment.
First, the Court heard the same evidence as did the jury, and to the
extent required in the Court's analysis of the second portion of this fee
dispute, considers the jury's finding not only binding, but wellsupported by the evidence.

Secondly, the Court must address Barrett's

counsel's claims of impropriety and lack of civility on the part of
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Christensen & Jensen in even filing this declaratory action, and also the
repeated allegations of bad faith and other improprieties contained in
Barrett's counsel's briefs.
Christensen & Jensen had a legitimate dispute with Barrett.

The

jury and the undersigned found Christensen & Jensen's claims meritorious.
This Court is unable to detect any overreaching by Christensen & Jensen
as against Barrett.

Neither can the Court reach any type of conclusion

that Christensen & Jensen's

actions

in proceeding with this matter are

in any way representative of a lack of civility. While this Court would
certainly have preferred the dispute to be resolved without Court
involvement, it was not. Apparently, Christensen & Jensen attempted such
a course by offering mediation and/or arbitration, all of which was
rejected by Barrett.

There is no substance to the claims in oral

argument or in the briefs that Christensen & Jensen and/or its attorneys
acted

inappropriately

toward

Barrett,

rather

they

acted

with

professionalism and civility in a difficult case.
The

Court

anticipates

the

final / documents

to be drafted

in

accordance with the instructions herein/.
Dated this

day of July, ^<

flMOTHY R. HANSON
)ISTRICT COURT JUDGE

o/Ol
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
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Roger P. Christensen
Karra J. Porter
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants
50 S. Main Street, Suite 1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
David G. Williams
Rodney R. Parker
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
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E. Barney Gesas
Charles R. Brown
Walter A. Romney, Jr.
Attorneys for Defendants Barrett and Slusher
201 South Main Street, Thirteenth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216
W. Scott Barrett
108 North Main, Suite 200
Logan, Utah 84321
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AGREEMENT
AgreemenC made Chia £
&*Y o f gcpfccmhar, 1 9 8 4 . b y and
0mous R o b e r t S l u s h e r (SLUSHER) , John and W l n n i f r e d O s p i C a l
(OSPITAL) , and CurCis Campbell (CAMPBELL).
WHEREAS, a s a r e s u l t o f a n a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n c w h i c h o c c u r r e d
o n o r a b o u t May 2 2 , 1 9 8 1 , SLUSHER and OSPITALS h a v e h e r e t o f o r e
brought a c t i o n s a g a i n s t CAMPBELL s e e k i n g damages f o r p e r s o n a l
i n j u r i e s and w r o n g f u l d e a t h i n t h e F i r s t D i s t r i c t Court f o r Cache
County, S t a t e o f U t a h , e n t i t l e d " S l u s h e r v s . C a m p b e l l , e t * a l . " „
C i v i l N o . 1 9 9 1 0 , r e f e r r e d t o h e r e a f t e r a s CACHE COUNTY CASEWHEREAS, t r i a l i n s a i d CACHE COUNTY CASE was h e l d i n
S e p t e m b e r , 1 9 8 3 , r e s u l t i n g i n a j u r y f i n d i n g that: CAMPBELL was
100X a t f a u l t : f o r s a i d a c c i d e n t and a j u r y v e r d i c t : and j u d g m e n t
a g a i n s t CAMPBELL i n a n amount o f $ 1 3 3 , 0 9 8 . 2 5 i n f a v o r o f SLUSHER
and $51 , 8 4 5 . 6 8 i n f a v o r o f OSPITALS;
WHEREAS , CAMPBELL was i n s u r e d w i t h S t a t e . Farm I n s u r a n c e
Company (STATE FARM) a t t h e t i m e o f s a i d a c c i d e n t , and s h o r t l y
a f t e r s a i d a c c i d e n t , CAMPBELL g a v e STATE FARM n o t i c e o f s a i d
a c c i d e n t and f u l l y c o o p e r a t e d w i t h t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f STATE
FARM • i n t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f s a i d a c c i d e n t .
WHEREAS, STATE FARM r e t a i n e d A t t o r n e y W e n d e l l E. B e n n e t t
defend CAMPBELL i n s a i d CACHE COUNTY CASE.

to

WHEREAS, STATE FARM and i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , i n c l u d i n g
Attorney B e n n e t t , a t no time p r i o r t o t h e j u r y v e r d i c t e v e r
a d v i s e d CAMPBELL.; t h a t c h e r e was a s i g n i f i c a n t - r i s k o f a judgmenc
a g a i n s t h i m . C h a t a p o s s i b L e judgment may w e l l e x c e e d h i s p o l i c y
l i m i t s o f $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 p e r c l a i m , and chac t h e r e w e r e a d v e r s e w i t n e s s e s
and e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t CAMPBELL'S p o s i t i o n , and STATE FARM t h r o u g h
i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , e x p r e s s l y a d v i s e d CAMPBELL on numerous
o c c a s i o n s t h a t h e had l i C C l e o r no c h a n c e o f l o s i n g t h e c a s e and
t h a t e v e n i f some o f t h e f a u l t o f Che a c c i d e n t was a t t r i b u t a b l e Co
him, any l i a b i l i c y would b e l e s s Chan h i s p o l i c y l i m i c s ;
WHEREAS, i t a p p e a r s chaC STATE FARM u n f a i r l y and i n bad f a i c h
m i s r e p r e s e n t e d a n d / o r f a i l e d Co d i s c l o s e Che r i s k s o f CAMPBELL'S
p e r s o n a l e x p o s u r e and w i t h i n d i f f e r e n c e f a i l e d t o a d v i s e him o f
t h e e x i s t e n c e o f . advetrse t e s t i m o n y ;
WHEREAS, STATE FARM had ample opporCuniCy b e f o r e a n d d u r i n g
Che C r i a l t o s e c c l e Che c l a i m s o f SLUSHER and OSPITALS f o r t h e
amounC o r l e s s Chan Che amount o f CAMPBELL'S p o l i c y l i m i t s , b u t

-2f a i l e d t o do s o , and d i d n o t even make an a t t e m p t t o n e g o t i a t e
s e t t l e m e n t of t h e s e claims;.

a

WHEREAS, b y r e a s o n o f t h e bad f a i t h o f STATE FARM, CAMPBELL
h a s a c l a i m a g a i n s t STATE FARM t o r e c o v e r damages r e s u l t i n g from
t h e bad f a i t h ;
WHEREAS. CAMPBELL h a s n o t o t h e r i n s u r a n c e t o pay t h e
j u d g m e n t s o f SLUSHER and OSPITALS; h e i s r e t i r e d and unemployed;
and h e would h a v e t o j e o p a r d i z e h i s f i n a n c i a l s e c u r i t y t o
p e r s o n a l l y pay t h e c l a i m s o f SLUSHER and OSPITALS;
WHEREAS, SLUSHER and OSPITALS "are w i l l i n g t o c o v e n a n t n o t t o
e x e c u t e a g a i n s t CAMPBELL* S p e r s o n a l a s s e t s i n t u r n f o r CAMPBELL'S
a g r e e m e n t h e r e i n t o s h a r e w i t h them t h e r e c o v e r y a g a i n s t STATE
FARM;
NOW THEREFORE, f o r t h e c o v e n a n t s h e r e i n , and o t h e r good and
v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the parties agree a s f o l l o w s t
T. E x c e p t a s s t a t e d h e r e i n , SLUSHER and OSPITALS s h a l l n o t
e x e c u t e on any o f t h e p e r s o n a l a s s e t s and p r o p e r t y o f CAMPBELL
e x c e p t a s i t r e l a t e s t o t h e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y w i t h STATE FARM o r
a n y o t h e r i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y t h a t may o f f e r i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e f o r
s a i d „ a c c i d e n t . The j u d g m e n t , however, s h a l l r e m a i n owing and
s a t i s f i e d o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t payment i s made t h e r e o n .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n t h e e v e n t any c r e d i t c h e c k i s made by a c r e d i t
a g e n c y , SLUSHER and OSPITALS s h a l l d i s c l o s e t h a t CAMPBELL has no
p e r s o n a l l i a b i l i t y o n t h e same and t h a t n o n e o f h i s a s s e t s a r e
s u b j e c t t o e x e c u t i o n i n o r d e r to pay t h e s a m e . SLUSHER and
OSPITALS a g r e e t o e x e c u t e a P a r t i a l R e l e a s e o f s a i d Judgment upon
r e q u e s t o f CAMPBELL a s Co any r e a l p r o p e r t y CAMBPELL may b e b u y i n g
or s e l l i n g ,
2 . CAMPBELL s h a l l f u l l y pursue and p r o s e c u t e a l l c l a i m s h e
may h a v e a g a i n s t STATE FARM and s h a l l f u l l y c o o p e r a t e and a s s i s e
h i s a t t o r n e y s i n p u r s u i n g s a i d c l a i m s . Upon t h e r e c o v e r y o f any
m o n i e s , w h e t h e r by s e t t l e m e n t or j u d g m e n t , CAMPRFT/r s h a l l d i s b u r s e
t h e p r o c e e d s o f any s u c h r e c o v e r y as f o l l o w s :

(a) for the c o s t s and expenses of the l i t i g a t i o n ,
including a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s ;
(b)
and OSPITALS,
(c)
the following

t o t h e payment o f t h e j u d g m e n t s i n f a v o r o f SLUSHER
i n c l u d i n g i n t e r e s t and c o s t s ;
t h e b a l a n c e s h a l l bf> f*f glvn-r-?*>«t m rh*=r p a r t i e s upon
p r o p o r t i o n : SLUSHER 45Z OSPITALS 45Z CAMPBELL 1QZ,

3

-3/WSLUSHER and OSPITALS s h a l l be k e p t f u l l y a d v i s e d o f t h e
p r o g r e s s and s t a t u s o f t h e c l a i m s a g a i n s t STATE FARM, and s h a l l
h a v e t h e r i g h t t o be a p a r t o f a l l major d e c i s i o n s r e l a t i n g t o
s a i d L i t i g a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g any n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r s e t t l e m e n t * T h e r e
s h a l l b e n o s e t t l e m e n t o f any c l a i m a g a i n s t STATE FARM w i t h o u t t h e
a p p r o v a l o f SLUSHER and OSPITALS.
4 - CAMPBELL h e r e b y r e t a i n s t h e l a w f i r m o f C h r i s t e n s e n ,
J e n s e n a n d P o w e l l o f S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h , and B a r r e t t and Brady
o f L o g a n . U t a h , a s h i s a t t o r n e y s t o p u r s u e a l l l i t i g a t i o n and
c l a i m s a g a i n s t STATE FARM, A t t o r n e y ' s f e e s w i l l b e b a s e d upon a
c o n t i n g e n c y f e e o f o n e - t h i r d o f any r e c o v e r y , p l u s e x p e n s e s and
c o s t s . I n che e v e n t t h e r e i s no r e c o v e r y , o r i n s u f f i c i e n t r e c o v e r y
t o c o v e r t h e e x p e n s e s and c o s t s , t h e p a r t i e s s h a l l b e r e s p o n s i b l e
t o p a y s a i d c o s t s o n t h e same p r o p o r t i o n a t e b a s i s a s o u t l i n e d i n
p a r a g r a p h 2 ( c ) a b o v e . No s u b s t a n t i a l c o s t s w i l l b e i n c u r r e d ( i n
e x c e s s o f $ 5 0 0 ) w i t h o u t t h e a p p r o v a l o f CAMPBELL* I n t h e e v e n t
t h e r e i s a n a p p e a l a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e l i t i g a t i o n a g a i n s t STATE
FARM, t h e a t t o r n e y 1 s f e e s w i l l be b a s e d upon a c o n t i n g e n c y f e e o f
40% o f any r e c o v e r y , p l u s e x p e n s e s and c o s t s *
5 - I t h a s b e e n d i s c l o s e d and t h e p a r t i e s a r e aware t h a t s a i d
law f i r m s h a v e r e p r e s e n t e d SLUSHER and OSPITALS i n t h e CACHE
COUNTY CASE and w i l l c o n t i n u e t o r e p r e s e n t SLUSHER and OSPITALS
h e r e a f t e r . The p a r t i e s a r e f u r t h e r aware t h a t t o p u r s u e t h e
a n t i c i p a t e d c l a i m s a g a i n s t STATE FARM i t w i l l b e n e c e s s a r y t o
p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e o f t h e communications w i t h STATE FARM c o n c e r n i n g
s e t t l e m e n t o f t h e CACHE COUNTY CASE p r i o r t o t r i a l - Inasmuch a s L.
Rich Humpherys and S c o t t B a r r e t t had some p a r t i c i p a t i o n in s u c h
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y e x i s t s t h a t t h e y may be r e q u i r e d
to t e s t i f y a t t r i a l .
I t i s b e l i e v e d 9 however, t h a t such
p o s s i b i l i t y i s remote as i t i s a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t s u c h f a c t s w i l l
e t c h e r b e u n d i s p u t e d o r r e a d i l y e s t a b l i s h e d b y documentary
e v i d e n c e and o1t h e r w i t n e s s e s .
Because o f t h i s 9 arid b e c a u s e o f
said a t t o r n e y s
k n o w l e d g e o f t h e r e l e v a n t f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s
and t h e i r e x p e r t i s e , t h e p a r t i e s d e s i r e t o h a v e s a i d a t t o r n e y s
r e p r e s e n t them i n t h e c l a i m s a g a i n s t STATE FARM,
6 . E a c h p a r t y h a s had t h e a d v i c e o f s e p a r a t e c o u n s e l as i t
r e l a t e s t o t h e terms o f t h i s agreement f r e e l y and v o l u n t a r i l y , and
e a c h p a r t y s h a l l c o n t i n u e t o have t h e r i g h t t o s e p a r a t e p e r s o n a l
c o u n s e l t o a d v i s e them c o n c e r n i n g t h e i r p e r s o n a l r i g h t s and
o b l i g a t i o n s hereunder.
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December 3, 2001
Curtis and Inez Campbell
P.O. Box 130
Lewiston, UT 84320
John and Winifred Ospital
1789 Seven Oaks Lane
Ogden, UT 84403
Robert Slusher
c/o 537 Raintree Dr.
Danville, Indiana 46122
Re:

Campbell v. State Farm

Dear Clients:
As you can imagine, my schedule since the opinion came out has been extremely hectic
for me. We have had to address a number of very weighty issues regarding your case, not to
mention the other cases I have had to deal with. I have tried to keep you informed, however,
various things happen on a regular basis. I will nonetheless do my best to keep you advised of
important events.
State Farm filed a Petition for Rehearing on November 19, 2001, requesting the court
reconsider its decision. We do not believe it is likely that the Supreme Court will grant the
petition for rehearing. We have filed an objection. If any of you wish to have copies, please let
me know.
State Farm has indicated that, if unsuccessful with the Utah Supreme Court, it will file a
petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The timing'will depend on how long it
takes the Utah Supreme Court to resolve the petition for rehearing. The petition to the U.S.
Supreme Court will likely be filed by early spring. We should know by early summer if the U.S.
Supreme Court is interested in taking the case.
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There have been no further settlement discussions since our last correspondence to you.
Because of the difficulty in keeping track of oral conversations and to facilitate conveying to
each of you the other's feelings and decisions, I would ask that you communicate with me in
writing regarding your decisions and/or proposals regarding settlement. This will avoid
confusion or misunderstandings and will assist me in communicating your feelings to the others.
I have had requests from the tax lawyers to receive a copy of your agreement regarding
the sharing of the recovery. You may recall that in 1995, you agreed to share the recovery
among you on an equal one-third basis. This agreement evolved over a long period of time and
included various correspondence and agreements signed separately by each of you. The first
agreement was in December 1984, wherein Curtis Campbell agreed to share his recovery - 45%
to Bob Slusher; 45% to the Ospitals; and 10% to Mr. Campbell. When we filed the bad
faith/fraud action, Inez Campbell joined as a plaintiff. She was not a party to the 1984
agreement, which made it very problematic in addressing issues such as settlement negotiations,
apportioning an award of punitive damages among you and in presenting the claims of Curtis
and Inez to the jury. It also created potential conflicts of interest among the parties. After
discussing these issues at length, the parties unanimously agreed to share all recoveries,
including the recoveries of Inez Campbell, based upon an equal one-third share to the Campbells,
the Ospitals and Bob Slusher. Your agreements to share the award came in different documents
which contained other information, such as status reports and settlement negotiations.
In order to have a single document that contains the terms of our agreement, without all
of the other information not specifically related to the agreement, we recommend that each of
you execute an Agreement, a copy of which I enclose for your review. If the enclosed
Agreement includes your understanding of all of the tenns of our prior agreement, please execute
the same and return by mail the enclosed copy.
If you have any questions or wish to discuss the above, please don't hesitate to call. I am
preparing for another trial starting on December 10 and will not always be available during the
next three weeks. If you call and I am unavailable, please ask for Kana Porter, my partner who
has been working closely with me on your case. She is fully aware of the details and will
hopefully be able to properly address your questions.
Very truly,

L. Rich Humpherys
LRH/mg
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Confidential Settlement
Communication

Re: Campbell v. State Farm
Dear Rich:
This letter is sent with the express authorization of our client, State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, State Farm would like to settle the above-entitled
matter with you and your clients before the Utah Supreme Court rules on State Farm's
soon to be filed petition for rehearing. If the case is not settled, State Farm intends to
file a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. This offer is based upon
the estimated full value of the judgment including simple interest from the date of entry
of the original verdict after factoring in the risk to the plaintiffs that the judgment will be
reduced or remanded for further proceedings. State Farm proposes to settle on the
following terms:
(i) State Farm will immediately escrow the sum of $150,000,000, to be paid to
you and your clients upon the Utah Supreme Court's vacating the opinion and
decision issued on October 19, 2001; and
(n) you and your clients will join State Farm in filing with the Utah Supreme Coui I
a notice, pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 37, that the matter has
been settled in its entirety and is now moot, as well as a request that the court
vacate its opinion and decision in the matter;
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The terms of this proposed settlement are confidential arid shall not be
admissible in this or any other court proceeding. State Farm requests that you present
this offer to your clients and respond to me in writing by noon on Friday, November 16,
2001.
Sincerely,

Michael D. Zimmerman
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P.O. Box 130
Lewiston, UT 84320
John and Winifred Ospital
1789 Seven Oaks Lane
Ogden, UT 84403
Robert Slusher
1692 E. County Road 800 So.
Clayton, IN 46118
Re:

Campbell v. State Farm

Ueai' ( li^nls:
I recently had an unusual call from Paul Belnap, State Farm's attorney. H e
asked what amount the plaintiffs would be willing to accept to have this matter settled. I
told him I had no idea. It has been 5 years since State Farm addressed any interest in
negotiations. He then quickly added that State Farm was not making any offer, though
"off the record" it was his opinion that State Farm would be willing to negotiate. I told
him it may take a few weeks to respond, given the number and location of the people
involved. He then asked that I get back to him when I can.
I find this call most unusual, since we are quite close to having an opinion out of
the Utah Supreme Court. All logic would indicate that if State Farm had an interest in
approaching settlement, they would have done so before all of the expense of t h e
appeal was incurred. There now appears little expense to save except an adverse
ruling which will hurt State Farm nationwide in other cases. It would hardly makes
sense for State Farm to think that we would cave in after remaining firm for 20 years.
One conclusion that can be drawn, is that Strong & Hanni/State Farm has received
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some "leak" from the supreme court that State Farm is facing an adverse ruling.
Perhaps it came in an innocuous comment by a clerk, secretary, runner, etc., such as,
"State Farm better look out," or perhaps Justice Howe may have raised his eyebrows or
something may have slipped out while talking with his son-in-law Stuart Schultz (who is
with Strong & Hanni and has defended this case with Paul Belnap) that made Mr.
Schultz draw the conclusion that the ruling will be adverse to State Farm. I would doubt
that Justice Howe would knowingly breach his duty of confidentiality. Perhaps we are
reading too much into this.
Whatever the case is, we should respond, even if our response is that we don't
wish to settle. Ultimately, the decision of how to proceed is yours. Bear in mind that
under your agreement to split the recovery equally between the three sets of plaintiffs,
you also agreed that a decision to settle has to be a unanimous decision.
Here are some considerations as you think through the matter:
1.
We believe that the chance of getting less than the present amount of the
judgment (now over $30 million) is low. State Farm's recent inquiry provides further
comfort that it also is concerned about an adverse ruling. Obviously, there are no
guarantees but it seems highly unlikely that the Court would ever reverse the judgment
and remand the matter back for another trial.
2.
There is a chance that the Court may adjust the judgment upward to either
reinstate the full amount or remand the matter back to the trial court with instructions to
look at the amount of punitive damages again with less or no concern about the ratio
between compensatory and punitive damages. Judge Bohling has already stated that,
were it not for the constraints of the ratio, he would have sustained the full amount of
punitive damages. If the case is remanded for this reason, it would appear highly
unlikely that Judge Bohling would award less, but likely he would award more and
perhaps sustain the full amount. The supreme court has broad latitude in what it
chooses to do. We, therefore, cannot predict with any degree of precision how this may
unravel.
3.
If the present amount is fully affirmed or if the Court increases the amount
of the punitive damages, State Farm will likely file a petition with the United States
Supreme Court to hear the case. I understand that the U.S. Supreme Court takes less
than 10% of the petitions for review. The trial court's order and the evidence in this
case is such that we believe we have a good position and the U.S. Supreme Court
would not want to review the appeal. If a petition is filed, it will likely take another 6-8
months before the Supreme Court would deny State Farm's petition. If the U.S.
Supreme Court grants State Farm's review, it may be an additional 1 to 2 years before
the Court decides the appeal.
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4.
The present judgment of approximately $31 million is fairly secure, and
there is a chance that the judgment may be increased. Based strictly on an economic
analysis, we do not believe that a settlement for a compromised amount (less than $30
million) is appropriate. Aside from the economic analysis, all of us have expressed
strong feelings from the beginning about the need to expose State Farm's illegal
conduct and hopefully, change the insurance industry for the better. So far, we have
had some positive effects from all of our efforts. However, a supreme court opinion that
sustains the judgment is a much stronger message since it will be published in legal
books throughout the country and may be cited as authority by other courts. If the,case
settles, the Utah Supreme Court will not issue an opinion. This is likely the primary
reason why State Farm desires to avoid an adverse ruling. Sustaining the judgment
would also represent a stronger warning to other insurance companies not to engage in
similar practices.
5.
If less than all of you want to settle, there are possible alternatives to
explore. We could approach State Farm and suggest that we would be willing to settle
one-third of the judgment on a compromise basis, stating that only one of the three of
you desire to settle. State Farm may or may not entertain a partial settlement proposal.
While it may save them money if the full judgment is affirmed, it does not prevent an
adverse opinion from being published by the Utah Supreme Court (which may have far
more devastating effects).
6.
If one of you desire to take less than your one-third share, a possible way
to address this would be to approach a litigation financing company that would pay a
percentage of the judgment to the one who desires to settle. The Company would then
keep the full amount of that plaintiff's portion of the judgment should it be affirmed. The
one who settles would get nothing more. For illustration purposes, assume that one of
you insist on settling and were willing to take substantially less than your one-third
share. One-third of $30 million ($10 million), minus 40% for attorney's fees and
approximately $200,000 for a proportionate share of litigation expenses would b e
approximately $5.8 million. If a finance company were willing to give the one who wants
to settle one-half of the judgment, this person would receive approximately $2.9 million,
in turn for a full assignment to the company of that person's net interest. This person
would receive the $2.9 million regardless of the outcome of the case. The finance
company would keep all of that person's share of the judgment, even if the $145 million
punitive award were reinstated. It may take a few weeks to a few months before we
one would know what a finance company is willing to do.
When you have had a chance to review the above, please let me know your
feelings. If you are not inclined to compromise, we could make an offer to settle for an
amount above the present judgment, or we could simply respond that we are not
interested in negotiating a settlement. We could invite State Farm to make the first
C&J/B000444
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offer. If you collectively want to consider less than the present judgment, we would
need to reach an agreement on how to proceed.
I am happy to discuss this with any of you by phone, however, once you have
reached a conclusion, I would appreciate receiving your written response. This will
avoid a possible miscommunication. I look forward to hearing from you.

Very truly,
CHRISTENSEN kOENSEN^.C.

L. Rich Humpherys/
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W. Scott Barrett
Barrett & Daines
108 N . Main #200
Logan, UT 34 321
Re:

Campbell v. State Farm

Dear Scott:
This will confirm our agreement and understanding
concerning the split of the attorneys fees relating to this action.
Given the present posture of the case and our respective
involvements, we agreed that an equitable split of the attorneys
fees would he an apportionment of 2/3 of the fee to Christensen,
Jensen & Powell, and 1/3 to your office. You would continue to
render some assistance in the case and I would continue to be lead
counsel • Please sign where indicated on the enclosed copy of this
letter to confirm this agreement and return the copy to me.
We discussed your involvement in some of the current
pending discovery matters. First, I requested that you contact DrRuss^ll Hirst for the purpose of exploring to what extent the
stress of the excess judgment affected Mr- and Mrs. Campbell's
health.
You will note in the Campbells depositions that they
suffered from depression, high blood pressure and believe that Mr.
Campbell • s Parkinsons Syndrome was aggravated by the stress of this
case.
I have requested a complete copy of Dr. Hirst's medical
records and as soon as I receive the same I will forward them to
you. I suspect that before Dr. Hirst will address this issue, he
will need to understand the circumstances.
I often find that
doctors are unwilling participants until they understand the
circumstances through a personal meeting. I don*t know Dr. Hirst
but X would suspect that a personal meeting with him would be
important.
It might be prudent to have copies of the important
parts of the depositions available for Dr. Hirst to review or at
least a summary of the pertinent parts. I am enclosing a copy of
the Campbells depositions for your review.
In my supplemental
statement of facts in our memo in opposition to defendants motion
for summary judgmentr I outline these various facts and cite to the
pertinent pages of the depositions. Perhaps this can assist you
in locating the appropriate pages.
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W. Scott Barrett
October 10, 1990
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Second, you were going to pursue a motion to compel to
obtain the various documents from State Farm that were not
produced. In preparation for this motion, I have requested that
Ray Summers review the claims file and outline what is missingWe can then prepare an affidavit for him to sign outlining the
missing documents. I have also asked him to outline what claims
procedure manuals are available that would apply in this
circumstance *
It has been my experience after reviewing many
claims procedure manuals by many different companies, that there
is always a section on "Unfair Claims Practices" and on settling
and adjusting third party claims such as this one. State Farm has
taken the position that such information is proprietary and
therefore not discoverable. In additionr there are references in
State Farm's answers to claim committee reports and recommendations
to "General Claims." This information has not been produced.
I
do not believe that they are justified in taking this position and
that the court would award us the documents if we pressed for a
ruling.
I enclose a copy of our request for production of
documents and State Farm's answers. Would you please prepare the
appropriate motion and memo. If needed, I can appear at the time
of the hearing to save you a trip down from Logan.
Third, we are planning to take the deposition of Ray
Summers beginning January 2. State Farm has indicated that they
intend to cross-examine Ray Summer at length. You indicated that
either you or your associate would be available for the remainder
of the deposition after the first day.
I would plan to do the
direct examination.
I appreciate working with you in this case. Please don't
hesitate to call if you wish to discuss any aspect.
Very truly,
CHRISTENSEN
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American Bar Association
LAWYER PROPOSING TO MAKE OR ACCEPT AN AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT OR AGGREGATED
AGREEMENT
February 10, 2006
In seeking to obtain the informed consent of multiple clients to make or accept an offer of an aggregate settlement
or aggregated agreement of their claims as required under Model Rule 1.8(g), a lawyer must advise each client of the
total amount or result of the settlement or agreement, the amount and nature of every client's participation in the
settlement or agreement, the fees and costs to be paid to the lawyer from the proceeds or by an opposing party or
parties, and the method by which the costs are to be apportioned to each client.
Unlike Model Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct [FN1] which is a general rule governing
conflicts of interest relating to a lawyer's current clients, Rule 1.8 provides specific rules regarding eleven types of
conflicts of interest. As noted throughout the comments to Rule 1.8, the rule supplements duties set forth in Rule
1.7. Each of Rule 1.8's subparagraphs (a) through (j) describes a different and specific circumstance in which a
lawyer's self-interest might jeopardize the representation of a client. [FN2] This opinion considers the subject of
aggregate settlements or aggregated agreements addressed in Rule 1.8(g). [FN3]
Rule 1.8 (g) pertains to the conflicts of interest that arise when a lawyer or law firm (collectively referred to as
"lawyer") represents multiple clients, some or all of whose claims or defenses are to be resolved under a single
proposal (in a civil case) or plea agreement (in a criminal case). In such situations, subparagraph (g) supplements
Rule 1.7 by requiring an additional level of disclosure by the lawyer and by requiring that his clients' informed
consent to the settlement be in writing.
As noted in Comment [13] to Rule 1.8, differences in the willingness of each represented client to make or accept
an offer of settlement are among the risks that should be considered when a lawyer undertakes to represent multiple
clients in matters where a settlement or plea agreement proposal could create a conflict among them. Rule 1.8(g)
provides a focused application of Rulel.2(a), which protects a client's right in all circumstances to have the final say
in deciding whether to accept or reject an offer of settlement or to enter a plea; Rule 1.6, which requires that the
lawyer have his clients' consent to reveal information relating to his representation of each of them to all other
clients affected by the aggregate settlement or plea agreement; and Rule 1.7, which requires consent of all affected
clients when the representation of one or more of them will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to
the others.
Because the terms "aggregate settlement" and "aggregated agreement" are not defined in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, it first is necessary to explain those terms before identifying the disclosures required to satisfy
Rule 1.8(g). An aggregate settlement or aggregated agreement occurs when two or more clients who are represented
by the same lawyer together resolve their claims or defenses or pleas. It is not necessary that all of the lawyer's
clients facing criminal charges, having claims against the same parties, or having defenses against the same claims,
participate in the matter's resolution for it to be an aggregate settlement or aggregated agreement. The rule applies
when any two or more clients consent to have their matters resolved together. [FN4]
The claims or defenses to be settled in an aggregate settlement or aggregated agreement may arise in the common
representation of multiple parties in the same matter, for example, when damages are claimed by passengers on a
bus that rolls over, or by purchasers of a fraudulently issued stock, or when pleas are offered by criminal defendants
alleged to be part of a drug ring. They also may arise in separate cases. For example, the rule would apply to claims
for breach of warranties against a home builder brought by several home purchasers represented by the same lawyer,
even though each claim is filed as a separate lawsuit and arises with respect to a different home, a different breach,
and even a different subdivision. [FN5]
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Aggregate settlements or aggregated agreements not only arise in a variety of situations, but they also may take a
variety of forms. For example, a settlement offer may consist of a sum of money offered to or demanded by multiple
clients with or without specifying the amount to be paid to or by each client. Aggregate settlements or aggregated
agreements can occur both in the civil context, for example, when a claimant makes an offer to settle a claim for
damages with two or more defendants, and in the criminal context, when, for example, a prosecutor accepts pleas
from two or more criminal defendants as part of one agreement. [FN6]
Rule 1.8(g) deters lawyers from favoring one client over another in settlement negotiations by requiring that
lawyers reveal to all clients information relevant to the proposed settlement. [FN7] That information empowers each
client to withhold consent and thus prevent the lawyer from subordinating the interests of the client to those of
another client or to those of the lawyer. [FN8] Rule 1.8(g) thereby supplements the lawyer's duties under Rule 1.2(a)
to defer to his clients' roles as ultimate decision-makers concerning the objectives of the representation, and to abide
by his clients' decisions whether to settle a matter. [FN9] In acknowledgment of the heightened conflicts risks
encountered when multiple clients are represented in an aggregate settlement or aggregated agreement, Rule 1.8(g)
also requires that the clients' consent to the settlement or agreement be in writing, a requirement more strict than that
imposed in the general rule on conflicts, Rule 1.7. The lawyer's duty to make disclosures under Rule 1.8(g)
reinforces the lawyer's duty under Rule 1.4 to provide information reasonably necessary to permit the client to
decide to engage in the proposed settlement or agreement. [FN 10]
In order to ensure a valid and informed consent to an aggregate settlement or aggregated agreement, Rule 1.8(g)
requires a lawyer to disclose, at a mini-mum, [FN11] the following information to the clients for whom or to whom
the settlement or agreement proposal is made:
• The total amount of the aggregate settlement or the result of the aggregated agreement.
• The existence and nature of all of the claims, defenses, or pleas involved in the aggregate settlement or
aggregated agreement. [FN 12]
• The details of every other client's participation in the aggregate settlement or aggregated agreement,
whether it be their settlement contributions, their settlement receipts, the resolution of their criminal charges, or any
other contribution or receipt of something of value as a result of the aggregate resolution. For example, if one client
is favored over the other(s) by receiving non-monetary remuneration, that fact must be disclosed to the other
client(s).
• The total fees and costs to be paid to the lawyer as a result of the aggregate settlement, if the lawyer's fees
and/or costs will be paid, in whole or in part, from the proceeds of the settlement or by an opposing party or parties.
[FN13]
• The method by which costs (including costs already paid by the lawyer as well as costs to be paid out of
the settlement proceeds) are to be apportioned among them. [FN 14]
These detailed disclosures must be made in the context of a specific offer or demand. Accordingly, the informed
consent required by the rule generally cannot be obtained in advance of the formulation of such an offer or demand.
[FN15]
If the information to be disclosed in complying with Rule 1.8(g) is protected by Rule 1.6, the lawyer first must
obtain informed consent from all his clients to share confidential information among them. The best practice would
be to obtain this consent at the outset of representation if possible, or at least to alert the clients that disclosure of
confidential information might be necessary in order to effectuate an aggregate settlement or aggregated agreement.
[FN 16] If the lawyer seeks permission to share confidential information among his clients, and receives that
permission, he should explain to his clients that if a dispute arises between any of the clients subsequent to his
sharing their confidential information, the attorney-client privilege may not be available for assertion by any of them
against the other(s) on issues of commonly given advice. [FN17] Finally, in representations where the possibility of
an aggregate settlement or aggregated agreement exists, clients should be advised of the risk that if the offer or
demand requires the consent of all commonly-represented litigants, the failure of one or a few members of the group
to consent to the settlement may result in the withdrawal of the offer or demand.
Conclusion
Rule 1.8(g) is a prophylactic rule designed to protect clients who are represented by the same lawyer and whose
claims or defenses are jointly negotiated and resolved through settlement or by agreement. Unique and difficult
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conflicts between the clients and their lawyer, and between the clients themselves, are possible. By complying with
Rule 1.8(g), the lawyer protects his clients and himself, and helps to assure the finality and enforceability of the
aggregate settlement or agreement into which those clients have chosen to enter.
FNl. This opinion is based on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as amended by the ABA House of
Delegates in August 2003 and, to the extent indicated, the predecessor Model Code of Professional
Responsibility of the American Bar Association. The laws, court rules, regulations, rules of professional
conduct, and opinions promulgated in the individual jurisdictions are controlling.
FN2. See Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 146 (5th ed. 2002).
FN3.Rule 1.8(g) states:
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the
claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo
contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer's
disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation
of each person in the settlement.
"Informed consent" is explained in Rule 1.0(e), and "Confirmed in writing" is explained in Rule 1.0(b).
Some of the cases cited in this opinion rely upon Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 5-106 of the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, "Settling Similar Claims of Clients." It provided:
(A) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not make or participate in the making of an
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against his clients, unless each client has consented to the
settlement after being advised of the existence and nature of all the claims involved in the proposed
settlement, of the total amount of the settlement, and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
This opinion does not treat as aggregate settlements those settlements made in certified class action cases or
derivative actions. As Comment [13] to Rule 1.8 states:
Lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs or defendants, or those proceeding derivatively, may not have a
full client-lawyer relationship with each member of the class; nevertheless, such lawyers must comply with
applicable rules regarding notification of class members and other procedural requirements designed to
ensure adequate protection of the entire class.
Neither does this opinion address multi-party representation in bankruptcy cases.
FN4. Rule 1.8(g) does not address obligations to other clients having such similar claims or defenses who
are not included in the aggregate settlement or aggregated agreement. See Rule 1.7(a)(2).
FN5. Comment [13] to Rule 1.8 discusses subparagraph (g) in the context of common representation of
multiple clients by a single lawyer. "Common representation" is discussed in Rule 1.7 Comments [29]
through [33] solely in the context of the representation of multiple clients "in the same matter." Neither the
rule nor its comment, however, explicitly restricts the application of Rule 1.8(g) to common representation
of multiple clients in the same matter. Yet, as a practical matter, the more disparate the claims included in
an aggregate settlement proposal, the more likely it is that the proposal will run afoul of other provisions of
the Model Rules. For example, if a lawyer representing clients with factually and legally dissimilar claims
receives an aggregate settlement proposal, the lawyer may find it difficult to obtain the informed consent of
each of his clients to the disclosure of confidential client information necessary to satisfy Rule 1.8(g),
including the consent required even to disclose the fact that one client's settlement is conditioned on
another's. See discussion of Rule 1.6 infra. The lawyer also may find it more difficult to satisfy Rule 1.7,
particularly Rules 1.7(a)(2) and 1.7(b)(1).
FN6. The requirements to be met when a lawyer undertakes such multiple representations in a criminal
matter, and the implications of an accused's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, are
beyond the scope of this opinion.
FN7. See, e.g., In re Hoffman, 883 So.2d 425, 432 (La.), reh'g denied (2004) ("Once the joint
representation ... commenced, ... respondent owed each of his clients an equal degree of loyalty, and he
could not favor the interests of one client over another.")
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FN8. One risk posed by aggregate settlements is that the lawyer may be motivated to settle a group of many
claims and reap a substantial fee without the trouble of diligent development of the clients' claims. That is
likely to be a greater risk in an aggregate settlement than in the settlement of an individual claim, as the
sheer number of clients may make the potential fee much greater. As the Texas Court of Appeals stated:
Settling a case in mass without consent of the clients is unfair to the clients and may result in a benefit to
the attorney (speedy resolution and payment of fees) to the detriment of the clients (decreased recovery).
Unfairness is the cornerstone in an action for breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, when an attorney enters into
an aggregate settlement without the consent of his or her clients, the attorney breaches the fiduciary duty
owed to those clients.
Arce v. Burrow. 958 S.W.2d 239, 245 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997), judgment affd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999) (citations omitted).
FN9. Several courts have concluded that fee agreements that allowed for a settlement based upon a
"majority vote" of the clients represented violated Rule 1.8(g). See, e.g., The Tax Authority, Inc. v. Jackson
Hewitt Inc., 873 A. 2d 616, 627 (N.J.Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert, granted, 878 A.2d 855 (N.J. 2005)
(applying New Jersey's Rule 1.8(g) which, at the time, was practically identical to the pre-2002 ABA
Model Rule); Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc., 513 F.2d 892, 894-95 (10th Cir. 1975) (applying
Kansas's version of Model Code DR 5-106). Cf., Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1046,
1050-51 (D.Colo. 1999) (applying Colorado's Rule 1.7(b) (2) and (c)).
FN10. See, e.g., Ouintero v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 709 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985, writ ref d
n.r.e.) (applying Model Code DR 5-106).
The aggregate settlement rule also protects lawyers from claims by clients who consent but become
unreasonably dissatisfied following a settlement. For example, if a violation of the rule results in former
clients discovering later that their co-parties paid less or received more than they did, they are more likely
to sue or file a disciplinary complaint against their former lawyer. The same is true with aggregated
agreements involving multiple criminal defendants. If the clients are fully informed of the terms of the
agreement, and the stake of their codefendants in it, they are less likely to file claims and if they do, the
lawyer is in a better position to defend against them.
FN11. The unique facts and circumstances of any particular settlement may require additional disclosures
other than those outlined here.
FN12. See, e.g., State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Weeks, 897 P. 2d 246, 253 (Okla., Mar. 22, 1994)
(interpreting DR 5-106).
FN13. See, e.g., In re Hoffman, 883 So. 2d at 433 ("[D]uring the negotiation of the aggregate settlement,
the lawyer must confer with all of his clients and fully disclose all details of the proposed settlement....")
When the amounts of fees and costs to be paid to the lawyer as a result of the aggregate settlement are not
yet determined at the time of the settlement, the lawyer will need to disclose to each of his clients the
process by which those amounts will be established and who will pay them, and the amount he will be
requesting to be paid. To the extent that the lawyer will receive compensation from someone other than
each client, the lawyer will need to comply with the requirements of Rule 1.8(f).
FN14. For example, in cases where the clients are defendants with the same relative risk of an adverse
judgment in a civil suit, or if the clients are plaintiffs with similar claims of ascertainable and equal or
comparable value, then a sharing of the costs on a per capita basis may be appropriate. On the other hand, if
the clients are plaintiffs who were injured to various degrees in a common accident, and are executing a
contingency fee agreement where costs are not paid until a settlement is effectuated, a pro rata cost
distribution may be more equitable. Best practices would include the details of the necessary disclosures in
the writings signed by the clients.
The Committee is aware of authority holding that extensive disclosure is not required under both Rule
1.8(g) and Model Code DR 5-106. See, e.g., Scamardella v. Illiano, 727 A.2d 421, 426-28 (Md. App.
1999), cert, denied, 729 A.2d 406 (Md. 1999) (although acknowledging that "the fullest disclosure is the
best disclosure"); Petition of Mai de Mer Fisheries, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 635. 639-40 (P. Mass. 1985). The
Committee is unpersuaded by this authority and, therefore, reaches the conclusions stated above.
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FN15. See, e.g., In re Hoffman, supra note 13 ("The requirement of informed consent cannot be avoided by
obtaining client consent in advance to a future decision by the attorney or by a majority of the clients about
the merits of an aggregate settlement.")
FN16. See Comment [13] to Rule 1.8, which states in pertinent part:
Differences in willingness to make or accept an offer of settlement are among the risks of common
representation of multiple clients by a single lawyer. Under Rule 1.7, this is one of the risks that should be
discussed before undertaking the representation, as part of the process of obtaining the clients' informed
consent.
See also Comment [29] to Rule 1.7, which provides in part:
In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if
the common representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result
can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw
from representing all of the clients if the common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure
is so great that multiple representation is plainly impossible.
For guidance with respect to undertaking the representation of multiple clients, see Rule 1.7 Comments
[29] through [33].
FN17. Rules 1.6(a) and 1.4. See also Rule 1.7 Comments [30] and [31] for further discussion of the subject
of the treatment of confidential information in formulating and conducting a common representation.
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